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Articles
The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal
Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity
JEFFREY

H. KAHN*

INTRODUCTION

It is universally accepted that "fairness" is an essential requirement
of a good tax system. What constitutes fairness, however, is a more
complex question than is generally perceived. One expression of
perceived fairness is the concept of "horizontal equity," which provides
that persons with equivalent amounts of income should pay the same
amount of tax. A related, but narrower concept is what I refer to as
"parallelism"-that is, the same or equivalent receipts, expenditures or
losses should be treated the same by the tax law. One aspect of
parallelism, which is the focus of this Article, is the notion that if the
reimbursement of an expenditure or loss is excluded from the recipient's
income, the same type of expenditure or loss that is not reimbursed
should be fully deductible.
Clearly, parallelism should be taken into account in evaluating the
merits of some tax provisions. To take it into account, however, does not
mean that it must prevail over other legitimate goals of the tax law with
which the parallelism concept conflicts. This insight and the analysis of
specific provisions have led me to conclude that not only is parallelism
not always compelled, it is not always desirable. Each instance of
nonparallel treatment of the tax law should be examined separately to
determine whether there are competing principles that outweigh the goal
for parallel treatment. This Article will examine a number of provisions
where the tax law fails to provide parallel treatment for certain
reimbursed and unreimbursed expenditures or losses. In each case, I will
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. I would like to thank Danshera Cords,
Adam Feilbelman, Deborah Geier, Brant Hellwig, Douglas Kahn, Michael Kirsch, Leandra Lederman
and Lawrence Zelenak for their helpful comments and suggestions to this Article. I would also like to
thank the participants of the Santa Clara University School of Law work-in-progress group.
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examine the relevant considerations and reflect on the questions of the
proper role of the parallelism concept in the tax system and of the
appropriate weight to be accorded that concept. This Article will focus
on two circumstances in which a reimbursement of an expenditure or loss
is excluded from the recipient's income: (i) where an unreimbursed
expenditure or loss of the same type would not be deductible, and (2)
where such an unreimbursed expenditure or loss would be deductible,
but the deduction is subject to limitations.
It is common knowledge in the tax field that where a taxpayer is
reimbursed for an expenditure or loss, there is no difference in the
federal income tax' consequences whether either the reimbursement is
excluded from the taxpayer's gross income and no deduction is allowed
for the expenditure or loss, or instead a full deduction is allowed for the
expenditure or loss and the reimbursement is included in the taxpayer's
gross income.3 To illustrate, consider the circumstances of an employer's
reimbursement of an employee's business expense.
Taxpayer G expends $2,000 for travel expenses for a business trip
that G made on behalf of her employer. In the same year, the employer
reimburses G for the $2,ooo expense. Apart from this expenditure and
the reimbursement, G had taxable income of $35,000 that year. If G is
allowed a full deduction for the $2,000 she spent and is required to
include the reimbursement in her gross income, she will still have $35,000
in taxable income.4 If, instead, the reimbursement is excluded from G's
gross income and no deduction is allowed for her payment of the travel
expenses, she will also have taxable income of $35,000. So, on its face, it
would appear that, for income tax purposes, the exclusion of the
reimbursement is identical to allowing a deduction for the expenditure.'
i. Unless stated otherwise, I am discussing federal income tax considerations throughout the
Article.
2. In general, the deduction must be a nonitemized deduction to be fully deductible. An
itemized deduction is subject to limitations so that all or part of the item may not be deductible. See
Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argument for Structural Change in Tax Deduction
Classification,8o WASH. L. REv. 1, 8 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Indemnity Payments. Recovery of Capital
and the Contoursof Gross Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 38t, 386-87 (i995) ("Not allowing a deduction for a
loss, but treating a recovery of the loss in a later year as a return of capital, yields the same result-no
net income-as allowing a deduction for the loss and taxing the recovery.").
4. The $2,ooo deduction for the expenditure will wash out the $2,000 income from the
reimbursement, and so the taxpayer will be left with $35,ooo of taxable income.
5. Of course, the taxpayer's gross income will be greater if a deduction is chosen instead of an
exclusion. But, the taxpayer's taxable income, which is the figure to which tax rates are applied, will be
identical in either case. The size of a taxpayer's gross income is not irrelevant, but it is significant in
only a limited number of circumstances. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 54 3 (b)(2) (2000). Also, if the reimbursement
is received in a year after the expenditure, the tax consequence of a deduction for the latter or an
exclusion of the former will depend upon the taxpayer's marginal tax bracket in each year. But if we
ignore tax rate differentials, the deduction and the income items are equal and so net out to zero. Any
difference in tax brackets is random and will sometimes favor the taxpayer and sometimes favor the
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Indeed, it is because of that identity that the Internal Revenue Service
(the Service) permits an employee simply to exclude a reimbursement
for a deductible employee expense rather than to include the
reimbursement and take a deduction for the expenditure. 6
While there is no difference in tax consequences for an exclusion or
deduction when the expenditure or loss is reimbursed, there is a
significant difference if no deduction is allowed but the taxpayer is not
fully reimbursed. There are numerous provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code7 (the Code) where a reimbursement of an expenditure or loss is
excluded from income even though no deduction is allowable to the
taxpayer for the portion of an expenditure or loss that is not reimbursed.
Since the exclusion and deduction approaches generally are identical for
tax purposes, one might expect there to be parallel treatment of
reimbursed and unreimbursed expenditures and losses. That is, one
might expect a taxpayer who incurs an expenditure or loss to be treated
the same by the tax law whether the item is reimbursed or not. Yet, there
are many cases in which that is not so. The disparate treatment of
reimbursed and unreimbursed taxpayers in those cases seems inequitable
to some who believe that either deductions should be allowed for
unreimbursed items or, if not, no exclusion should be allowed for the
receipt of a reimbursement.8 While not all commentators have urged that
parallelism should be the rule, the question of whether to adopt parallel
treatment in specific circumstances is frequently discussed in tax courses.9
If the tax law were both to exclude from income the receipt of a
recovery or reimbursement for a loss or expenditure and also to allow an
unrestricted deduction to a taxpayer who incurred the same type of loss
or expenditure but who was not reimbursed, I would describe that
approach as "parallel" treatment. By "parallel" treatment, I mean that
similar, but not necessarily identical, receipts, expenditures or losses are
given the same tax treatment. If such items are treated differently by the
tax law, I refer to that approach as "nonparallel" treatment. Nonparallel
treatment results in disparate tax treatment of taxpayers who occupy

government.
6. Treas. Reg. § i.i62-I7(b)(i) (as amended in 199o). To qualify for exclusion, the employee
must have been required to provide the employer with an accounting of the expenses and done so. Id.
7. References herein to the Internal Revenue Code ("Code" or "I.R.C.") are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
8. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 123. 141 (13th ed. 2003);
WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL-FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 56 (t3th ed. 2003);
RICHARD L. SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 490 (2004) ("There is no

obvious policy justification for this general disfavoring of deductions relative to exclusions."). Contra
Sophia Hudson, An Argument for Untidiness:Non-Parallel Treatment of Exclusions and Deductions in
FederalIncome Taxation, 32 MICH. TAX LAW. 34 (20O6); Zelenak, supra note 3, at 387.
9. See KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, supra note 8; KLEIN ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL,
supra note 8; SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 8.
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similar positions, and that difference violates the principle of horizontal
equity.' Nonparallel treatment is then one type of violation of the
principle of horizontal equity. Consider the following illustration of
nonparallel treatment by the Code.
Code section I04(a)(2) excludes from income compensatory
damages received by a taxpayer on account of a physical injury." In
essence, as shown above, this exclusion is the same, for tax purposes, as
requiring the taxpayer to include the damage payment in income but also2
providing a matching full deduction for the amount of the damages.'
Thus, the Code effectively provides for the equivalent of a deduction for
a loss based on a physical injury for which compensation is received.
That suggests that, in order to have parallel treatment, taxpayers should
be allowed a deduction for a loss resulting from an uncompensated
physical injury.
No such deduction currently exists, and so the Code does not adopt
parallel treatment in this circumstance. That is, the Code effectively
provides a deduction for the taxpayer who happens to be compensated
for a physical injury, 3 but provides no corresponding relief for a taxpayer
who is not compensated. This lack of parallelism also contravenes the
principle of horizontal equity.'4 Assume A and B are injured in separate
car accidents and sustain similar physical injuries valued at the same
dollar amount.'5 A's injuries were caused by a wealthy individual, and A
Io.The meaning of "horizontal equity" is explained infra note 14.
ii.One exception to that exclusion is that a reimbursement of medical expenses that were
previously deducted by the injured party are included in the latter's income. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2000).
12. For the deduction to be an exact equivalent to an exclusion of the payment, the deduction
would have to be allowable in the same year that the injured taxpayer received the payment from the
tortfeasor, and that will not usually be the case. But, the principal significance of there being a
different time sequence is that the marginal rates for the deduction and the income may differ because
they fall in different tax years. That difference in marginal rates can be ignored because it will have a
random effect. See supra note 5. While the difference in time also raises a "time value" issue, the
amount of time value money likely will be small.
13. As noted, the exclusion from income is equivalent to allowing a deduction for the loss.
14. Horizontal equity requires that persons in like net income positions pay the same amount of
income tax. Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or ProperAllowance for
Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. i,I n.5 (i979). The goal of differently taxing individuals
with disparate net income is referred to as vertical equity. WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASic FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 7-8 (5th ed. 1999). The goal of vertical equity generally includes a requirement that
there be an "appropriate" difference in taxation among unequals. Paul R. McDaniel & James R.
Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The MusgravelKaplow Exchange, I FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607
(1993). Many people disagree about what type of difference is appropriate.
Horizontal and vertical equity are two aspects of the same principle. See id. at 612; Louis Kaplow,
A Note on Horizontal Equity, I FLA. TAX REV. 191, 195 (1992). Contra Richard A. Musgrave,
HorizontalEquity: A FurtherNote, IFLA. TAX REV. 354. 354 (I99_)
(contending that horizontal equity
has independent significance that is distinct from vertical equity). While, for convenience, this Article
refers only to horizontal equity, it applies equally to vertical equity. Indeed, as used in this Article,
"horizontal equity" refers to either horizontal or vertical equity or to both.
15. There are serious administrative difficulties in determining the value of an uncompensated
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is compensated one million dollars for the damages caused by the
accident. B is struck by an individual with limited means and is not able
to recover any damages for his injuries. Assume that, other than the
damage recovery, A and B have the same amount of taxable income.
Since A's injury was physical, A is able to exclude the one million
dollars recovery from income under Code section I04(a)(2) and
therefore is not taxed on that amount. A and B are treated as having
equal income for tax purposes and will pay the same amount of income
tax. By providing A an exclusion (the equivalent of allowing A a
deduction for the injury) and denying a deduction to B, the tax system
has violated horizontal equity since A and B are taxed the same amount
even though A has received one million dollars more in that year than
B. 6 Putting it differently, A is effectively allowed a deduction for his
injury (offsetting the compensation received), while B is denied a
deduction for a virtually identical (but uncompensated) injury. As we
shall see later in this Article, while horizontal equity can be obtained by
allowing a full deduction for such losses, that remedy contravenes other
policies. The principles of horizontal and vertical equity and parallelism
are among the myriad goals of a good tax system, and so they must give
way when weightier considerations point in a different direction." The
treatment of personal injury damages is discussed in Part III.B in this
Article.
The principal issue this Article addresses is whether parallelism
should be a compelling goal of the tax system. That question arises in
connection with numerous Code provisions, of which the treatment of
physical damages is merely one example. The issue of whether to adopt
parallelism obviously arises whenever the Code allows an exclusion for a
reimbursement or recovery of a nondeductible item, but it also arises
when there are limitations on the amount of the deduction allowable that
do not apply if the item is reimbursed or otherwise recovered."
physical injury, the presence of which is itself one of the reasons for not allowing a deduction for those
losses.
16. As noted, this assumes that A and B are equals for purposes of income comparisons. Also
note that while nonparallel treatment will contravene the principle of horizontal equity, it is only one
of the ways in which equity can be violated.
17. Some commentators contend that horizontal and vertical equity have no independent
significance. See Kaplow, supra note 14, at 192: McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 1A, at 612.
18. While the lack of parallelism exists just as much when the amount of deduction allowable is
limited to less than the full amount of the expenditure or loss, the commentary objecting to
nonparallel treatment has focused primarily on cases where no deduction is allowable. Nonparallelism
can also arise in other circumstances. For example, Professors Dodge and Soled state that the
nonrecognition granted by Code § 1031 for exchanges of certain like-kind property is contrary to tax
policy because a sale of such property immediately followed by a reinvestment is a taxable transaction.
Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under the Income Tax 68 n.284, Fla. St.
U. Coll. of Pub. Law Working Paper No. 149, 2005; Fla. St. U. Coll. of Law, Law-Econ Working Paper
No. 05-17, 2005, available at ssrn.com/abstract=68 1578. The disparity of treatment noted by Professors
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It is the thesis of this Article that different considerations apply to
reimbursed expenditures and losses than apply to unreimbursed items.
There may be compelling reasons for excluding a reimbursement from
income that do not apply to the determination of whether to allow a
deduction for unreimbursed items. And, there can be compelling reasons
to deny a deduction for an unreimbursed item that do not apply to the
treatment of reimbursements."9 In other words, the apparent equivalence
of the deduction and exclusion is deceptive because different policy
considerations can apply to each. So, the crucial question in such cases is
whether the goal of parallel treatment is sufficiently strong to outweigh
the other considerations.
This analysis has led me to conclude that parallel treatment not only
is not compelled, it is not always desirable because of countervailing
considerations that weigh more heavily. Each instance of nonparallel
treatment must be examined to determine whether the contravention of
parallelism is warranted. ° This Article will examine a number of
provisions where the Code fails to provide parallel treatment for
exclusions and deductions, including some in which no deduction is
allowable for unreimbursed items and some where deductions are
allowable but are subject to limitations. In each case, the relevant
considerations will be examined.2'
I. HORIZONTAL EQUITY-THE MUSGRAVE/KAPLOW EXCHANGE

The principle of horizontal equity typically will not resolve a
question as to what tax treatment is proper for a specific circumstance
because its application rests on a determination that parties are in equal
positions; and the determination of equality rests on a choice of the
contact points that are to be compared, about which reasonable people
can disagree and often do so. For individual income tax purposes,
equality refers to income, and thus income is the item on which
individuals are to be compared; but there is not universal agreement as
to what items are to be taken into account to determine a person's
Dodge and Soled is similar to the nonparallelism that is examined in this Article, but does not fall
within the definition of nonparallelism as used herein.
19. See Zelenak, supra note 3, at 387.
20. See Hudson, supra note 8. If you determine that there is no merit to allowing an exclusion,
then obviously that exclusion should be repealed. However, the reason for that repeal would be to
eliminate an unwarranted tax benefit rather than to obtain parallel treatment even though one
consequence of the repeal would be the elimination of the nonparallelism that existed.
21. This Article addresses only a small number of instances of nonparallelism to illustrate the
type of analysis that is required. There are numerous nonparallel provisions that are not discussed
herein. For example, most of the employee fringe benefits that are excluded from an employee's
income would not be deductible if paid by the employee or by a self-employed individual. Also, the
deferral provided for employee retirement plans is more extensive than that provided for the selfemployed. Each of those nonparallelisms should be examined in the same manner as the ones
discussed herein.
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income.22
Some commentators have concluded that horizontal equity is not a
useful concept for determining whether a provision is good or bad
because the horizontal equity concept rests on a choice of what the
proper measurement of income should be.23 Even if one concurred with
that view, horizontal equity might be seen as a surrogate for "basic
economic and justice decisions"24 or as a signal that a problem exists. In
other words, the fact that two persons who appear to be in similar
income circumstances are taxed differently suggests that there may be a
flaw somewhere in the tax system. By contrast, Professors McDaniel and
Repetti rejected that view and concluded that the concept of horizontal
equity not only does not aid in uncovering tax problems, but can actually
conceal problems and lead policymakers astray because it places an
obstacle between the policymaker and the actual problem. 5 The two
professors contend that it is better to go directly to the underlying
problem than to focus on the fact that a flaw in the tax system has caused
some persons to be treated inequitably., 6 In an important sense, while I
do not agree with many of the conclusions that the two professors
reached, the thesis and analysis of this Article conform to the policy that
Professors McDaniel and Repetti advocate. The focus of this piece is on
the difference in tax treatment of what appear to be very similar items
rather than on the purported inequitable consequence of that treatment;
and so the analysis set forth herein directly addresses the underlying
problem.
Whatever may be the merits of the conflicting views on the role of
horizontal equity, the parallelism concept, which is the focus of this
Article, is not subject to those objections. If two persons receive different
tax treatment for the same type of expenditure-what I refer to as
nonparallel treatment-that disparate treatment raises serious issues of
propriety whether or not those issues are classified as violations of
horizontal equity. Regardless of the name given to this problem, it is a
goal of the tax system to avoid its occurrence. The establishment of equal
treatment of the same items not only serves the normative goal of
"fairness," it also provides the taxpaying public with confidence that they
are being treated fairly; and that perception is as important as the reality.
Fairness of treatment then is a normative value on which the parallelism
concept is based. I chose the word "parallelism" to designate that goal
because it is useful to have a common term to refer to it.
22.

See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 14, at 3-5.

23. Kaplow, supra note 14, at 192-93; McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 14, at 612-13. Contra

Musgrave, supra note 14, at 359.
24. McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 14, at 619.
25. Id. at 622.
26. Id.
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Professor Musgrave stated that almost everyone agrees with the
principle that people in equal positions should be given equal
treatment. 7 Professors Kaplow, McDaniel and Repetti, while disagreeing
with Professor Musgrave's thesis, do not reject that statement. Rather,
they question the utility of the concept of equality because of the
difficulty in determining the proper items of comparison.2 ' But, for
purposes of an income tax, there is no dispute that income is the proper
measure for comparisons; and when the items to be compared are
indistinguishable, there is no need to refer to or resolve questions of
what constitutes income.
Putting aside the question of the significance of the horizontal and
vertical equity concepts, let us now focus on parallelism. Clearly,
parallelism (i.e., equal treatment of similar items) must be taken into
account in evaluating some provisions. To take it into account, however,
does not mean that it must prevail over other legitimate goals of the tax
system with which it conflicts. As will be shown later in this Article, the
principle of parallelism is merely one factor to be considered and does
not unilaterally provide a definitive answer as to whether a tax provision
should be retained. However, merely because a principle is not sufficient
by itself to determine a result does not mean that it is a nullity.
Parallelism is related to the horizontal equity principle in that
nonparallel treatment will result in unequal treatment of some persons.
While this Article focuses on parallelism, all that is written herein also
applies to the broader principle of horizontal equity. For those few who
consider horizontal equality to be irrelevant, the application of this
Article's reasoning to that principle is of no consequence. However,
many persons do give weight to horizontal equity, and even those who do
not frown on unequal treatment of the same item.
II.

THE BEGUILING ArRACTIVENESS OF PARALLELISM

It is easy to see why many find the concept of parallelism so
attractive. Parallelism requires that taxpayers with the same loss or
expenditure be treated the same. Lack of parallelism instinctively
appears to be unfair. Indeed, there is a perverseness in the tax law's more
favorable treatment of the reimbursed party than is provided to the one
who is not compensated for his loss or expenditure since the latter is
more deserving of sympathy. In the example above concerning the
Musgrave, supra note 14, at 355.
28. On the issue of whether "equality" has any meaning in the administration of justice, compare
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (982), with Erwin Chemerinsky. In
Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983), Anthony D'Amato,
Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 8I MICH. L. REV. 6oo (983), Kenneth L. Karst, Why
Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983), and Kenneth W. Simons, Equality As a Comparative
Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1985). See also McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 14, at 612 n.28.
27.
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physical injuries suffered by A and B, why does A receive what amounts
to a deduction for his loss but B does not? Both A and B suffer the same
type and dollar amount of loss, but the tax system treats them differently
by effectively allowing A a deduction but denying any deduction to B,
even though A clearly is the better off of the two.
As noted above, a failure to provide parallel treatment violates the
frequently cited goal of horizontal equity. In our example, A and B will
be taxed the same despite the large difference in their incomes.
Horizontal equity can be achieved only if A and B are given parallel
treatment, either by providing a deduction to both or by denying a
deduction to both.
However, upon a more careful review, it becomes clear that
parallelism is not always the optimum result. To illustrate, consider the
case of a refunded income tax payment." Taxpayer X pays a federal
income tax of $23,000 for the year 2000. None of that payment is
deductible.3" In the year 2003, it is determined that X should have paid an
income tax for 2000 of only $20,000. Accordingly, the Service returns
$3,000 to X. X is not required to include that refund in income. The
$3,000 refund is excluded from X's gross income because it is not an
accession of wealth but instead a return of the money he erroneously
paid to the government. As noted, the effect of this exclusion is
equivalent to allowing X a deduction for the $3,000 overpayment in the
year that he received the refund.3'
Also, for the year 2000 Y paid a federal income tax of $23,000. In the
year 2005, it is discovered that Y should have paid an income tax of only
$20,000. Because the statute of limitations for claiming a refund had
expired, Y does not receive a refund for his $3,000 overpayment of the
year 2000 tax. Y is not allowed a deduction for that unrefunded
overpayment. But, X is allowed to exclude the $3,000 refund he received.
It is unlikely that the lack of parallel treatment for X and Y will bother
anyone even though the tax-favored party, X, is better off economically
than is the disfavored Y. It illustrates that each case must be judged on
the considerations that apply.
While the visceral reaction to the nonparellelism in the above
scenario is that it is appropriate, let us examine the treatment more
closely to see why that is so. Why should Y be denied a deduction for the
29.

For a similar example involving a refunded fine, see Zelenak, supra note 3. at 387. See also
(3d ed.

JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 246-50
2004).

30. I.R.C. § 275(a)(i) (200o).
31. Another way to view this occurrence is to apply the transaction approach and treat the refund
as a retroactive reduction of the payment that was previously made. This same approach can be
applied to other circumstances. One example is the discussion of tax indemnity payments in Part III.C
of this Article.
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overpayment of his taxes? One answer is that a deduction is allowed for
a loss only if there are compelling reasons for it. Losses incurred in a
business or profit-seeking activity are generally deductible." Personal
losses are not deductible unless they are the product of a theft or
casualty.33 Y's loss is not a business or profit-oriented loss, and is not a
casualty or theft loss.
A second and even more compelling reason for denying a deduction
is that the qualification for such a deduction would turn on a finding that
the tax for the year 2000 was overpaid. The point of having a statute of
limitations is to prevent the necessity of examining the correctness of
returns for which the statutory period has run. For the allowance of a
deduction to have any meaning, the prior return for the year 2000 would
have to be kept open, and that would frustrate the purpose of having a
limitations period.
On the other hand, if the overpayment is refunded before the statute
of limitations has run, there is no policy that would be frustrated by
excluding the refund from the taxpayer's gross income. To the contrary,
there is a policy reason to exclude the refund, and that policy would be
contravened if the refund were taxed. The refund is a return of the
taxpayer's money, and there are strong reasons not to tax someone on
the recovery of his own money. The taxpayer has not realized an
economic gain in any meaningful sense.34 The entire system of utilizing
basis to determine gain35 rests on the notion that one should not be taxed
on the recovery of one's own money.
In sum, there are strong policy reasons to deny a deduction for an
unrefunded overpayment of taxes; but, not only are there no policy
reasons to tax a refund, there are policy considerations that require its
exclusion. The critical question then is whether the goal of parallel
treatment is important enough to warrant either granting a deduction for
the unrefunded overpayment or, instead, taxing the refund. In other
words, does the goal of parallel treatment outweigh either of the
considerations discussed above? The resolution of that question turns on
value judgments. I believe it is obvious that parallel treatment in this case
is less important than the considerations whose satisfaction results in
I.R.C. § 165(c)(i), (2).
33. Id. § 165(c)(3). The rationale for allowing a deduction for casualty and theft losses is discussed
in Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions-A Tax "Ideal" or Just Another "Deal"?, 2002 L. REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1,37-40; see also infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
34. An exception to that policy occurs when the tax benefit rule applies to a recovery because the
taxpayer had previously taken a deduction that provided him with a tax benefit. I.R.C. § i I i(a); see
also DOUGLAs A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 183-84 (5th ed. 2005). The reason
for this exception is to prevent the taxpayer from retaining a tax benefit for an expenditure which he
subsequently recovered. The policy of preventing a taxpayer from retaining a deduction for which he
is no longer entitled outweighs the policy of not taxing a return of capital.
32.

35. I.R.C. § IOl(a).
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nonparallel treatment.
Let us examine one variation of the scenario set forth above.
Assume that in Y's case, the Service voluntarily refunded the
overpayment even though the statute of limitations on refund claims had
run. Obviously, that is unrealistic, 36 but let us consider the tax
consequences nevertheless.
In my view, the refund should not be taxed. Since the parties
involved, who are at arm's length, have concluded that there was an
overpayment, the Service should accept that conclusion. It does not
require a reexamination of the year 2000 tax return because the parties
have reached an agreement. The fact that one of the parties is the Service
itself makes the case much stronger, but the result should be the same if
the payor were a third party other than the Service.37 The only question
that might arise is whether the return of the funds is due to some reason
other than a determination that there was an overpayment-i.e., was this
a disguised compensation for some service or property? That issue does
not arise when the payor is the Service itself.
The above example is meant to illustrate the type of analysis that is
required when examining provisions that provide nonparallel treatment.
Part III of this Article will examine a number of specific Code provisions
that produce nonparallel results for taxpayers. In each case, I will analyze
whether such treatment is justified after examining the policies
underpinning the provisions.
III. SELECTED NONPARALLEL TAX PROVISIONS
A.

DAMAGE TO PROPERTY

If a taxpayer receives compensation for damaged property, the
taxpayer includes the recovery in income only to the extent that it
exceeds the basis of the property.38 For purpose of this rule, it does not
matter whether the payor is the person who damaged the property or a
third party insurer.3" As discussed in detail below, this exclusion is in
sharp contrast to the severe restrictions on the amount of deduction
allowable to a taxpayer who is not compensated for the loss when the
property in question was not used for a business or profit-making
purpose.
Prior to examining these conflicting treatments, it is useful to review
36. See I.R.C. §§ 6402(a), 6514, 7405.
37. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.C of this Article.
38. See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (ist Cir. 1994);
KAHN & KAHN, supra note 34, at 77-78. In appropriate circumstances, a taxpayer can defer all or part
of the gain realized on an involuntary conversion by investing in similar property within a specified
time period. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A).
39. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 34, at 77.
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the tax treatment where a taxpayer voluntarily sells personal use
property (i.e., "personal property").' For example, X owns a personal
use automobile with a basis of $5,000. X sells the automobile to Y for
$8,ooo cash, thereby realizing and recognizing a gain of $3,000.41 X is
required to include the $3,000 gain that he recognizes in his income.
However, X pays no tax on the other $5,ooo that X receives from Y. The
tax system treats the first $5,0o0 cash as a nontaxable return of capital as
measured by X's basis in the automobile.
What are the tax consequences to X if the automobile's fair market
value is less than X's basis? Assume that X receives only $3,000 cash
from Y for his personal car. Now, X realizes and recognizes a $2,000 loss
on the transaction. Again, X pays no tax on the return of capital, in this
case the $3,000 cash. But what of the $2,ooo basis that X failed to

recover? The current tax system will not allow X any deduction for the
$2,000 recognized loss since the automobile was personal use, rather than
business or investment, property.4 2
What is the justification for not allowing X to deduct the loss that he
recognized in an arm's length transaction with an unrelated person?
Basically, the loss is seen as an element of the personal consumption of
the asset. The decline in value of a personal use asset that arises because
of wear and tear, exhaustion, or obsolescence is not deductible because it
is seen as a cost of the personal use or consumption of the asset. That
treatment is consistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income. 43 Even
if the decline in the asset's value is due to market factors-as contrasted
to wear and tear or exhaustion-that decline in value is seen as part of
the cost of owning the asset, and so is seen as part of the cost of personal
consumption.'
40. In this Article, the term "personal property" is used to refer to personal use property rather
than its usual meaning of property other than realty.
41. I.R.C. § ioII(a).
42. Id. § t65(c).
43. The Haig-Simons definition of income is the most commonly cited definition for tax policy
purposes. It defines income for a period as the sum of the increase in wealth accumulated by the
person plus the market value of the person's personal consumption. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATON 50 (Univ. of Chi. Press 198o) (t938). Thus, in the above example, the system denies
a deduction to X because it assumes that the decline in value of the automobile is due to the personal
consumption or use by X. As consumption is one element of income under Haig-Simons, there should
be no deduction for that use.
44. Professor Richard Epstein argues that such market decline is not an element of consumption
and therefore should be deductible under our tax system. In order to distinguish between personal
consumption and market decline, Professor Epstein suggests that taxpayers should reduce their basis
in all depreciable assets (business, investment and personal) under a cost recovery system. While no
deduction would be allowable for the depreciation of personal assets, a taxpayer would still reduce his
basis in personal property to reflect the personal consumption. Under such a system, the taxpayer
would be allowed a deduction for any loss recognized on a sale of a personal asset on the assumption
that such loss was not due to consumption by the taxpayer and therefore should be deductible under
the Haig-Simons definition as a true loss of wealth. Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of
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Altering the hypothetical, what should be the tax consequence if,
instead of a voluntary sale, X's personal automobile were damaged in an
accident or stolen, and X received no compensation for the loss? One
reasonable approach is to treat X's loss as part of X's consumption (i.e.,
personal use to the exclusion of others) of the automobile, and so deny
any deduction for the loss-that is, "part of the cost of possessing an
asset is the risk that it might be damaged or stolen."45 That approach

would provide X with the same tax treatment he6 would have received if
he had voluntarily sold the automobile for a loss.
Instead, a different, but also reasonable, approach would allow X to
deduct a casualty or theft loss. A casualty or theft loss is different from a
loss on a voluntary sale in that it is sudden, unexpected, and involuntarily
forced on the taxpayer. The loss that a taxpayer incurs from an accident
or theft does not look like a consumption of the item; to the contrary, it
can be viewed as depriving the taxpayer of the use or consumption of the
asset. For example, consider the plight of an employee who collects his
pay in cash and is promptly mugged by a thief who takes the cash. It is
difficult to view the employee as having consumed the stolen cash in the
ordinary economic sense of that term. 47
Yet, a loss attributable to sudden and unexpected outside forces
does bear some similarity to a loss attributable to outside forces that
impact negatively on the market value of an asset, and no deduction is
allowed for losses attributable to market fluctuations. It would not be
unreasonable to treat both of those losses the same and deny a deduction
for both. But, it also would not be unreasonable to focus on the
PersonalProperty Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454, 460-6I (i970). As discussed

by Epstein, this system would not always benefit the taxpayer. Id. at 461. While an interesting
proposal, it raises serious administrative concerns.
45. Kahn, supra note 33, at 37.

46. The Joint Committee of Taxation clearly takes this view of casualty and theft losses as the
deduction is listed in the tax expenditure budget. See Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, io9th Cong.,
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2005-09 (Comm. Print 2005); see also Kahn,
supra note 33, at 37.
47. Without a casualty and theft deduction, the tax system would treat the employee whose cash
was stolen the same as another employee with the same pay who is able to deposit his earnings in the
bank and spend it on whatever he chooses. As noted by Professor Kaplow, the deduction will not put
the two taxpayers on equal footing ex ante. In order to do so, the government would have to transfer
funds to the employee in order to compensate for the theft. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as
Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance
Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1492-93 (199i) ("If one wished to provide fully equal treatment to

these precasualty equals, it would be necessary to make a transfer from the fortunate to the
unfortunate that compensated completely for the latter's losses.... To accomplish this transfer
through the tax system instead, a ioo% credit rather than a deduction would be necessary, with taxes
on each income class raised sufficiently to cover the costs."). However, contrary to Professor Kaplow's
inference, the purpose of the deduction is not to make the unfortunate employee whole, but instead is
meant to reflect the fact that because of the differences in their net wealth position, the two taxpayers
should not be taxed the same. The deduction accomplishes that goal.
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differences between market fluctuation losses and casualty losses and
make some tax allowance for the latter. Congress determined that the
consumption element of a casualty or theft loss was too significant to
allow a full deduction for it, but the nature of that type of loss did not
warrant ignoring it for tax purposes. So, Congress adopted a middle
ground. It allowed a deduction for casualty and theft losses of personal
use property, but it imposed severe limitations on the amount that can be
deducted. Indeed, the limitations are so severe that most taxpayers who
suffer such losses will not qualify for any deduction at all.
Code section 165(c)(3) allows a deduction for "losses of property not
connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for
profit, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty,
or from theft.""4 The taxpayer's loss is the lesser of the item's decline in
value or the taxpayer's basis in the item.49 These losses are sometimes
referred to as "personal casualty losses., 50 The limitations on those
deductions include:
i. No deduction is allowable to the extent that the taxpayer is
reimbursed for the loss or has a reasonable prospect of being
reimbursed."
For each casualty or theft, no deduction is allowable for the first
$I00 of loss from each event." The excess amount can be deducted
without restrictions only to the extent that the taxpayer has personal
casualty gains53 that year. The excess of a taxpayer's personal casualty
losses for a year (minus the $ioo floor) over the taxpayer's personal
casualty gains for that year is sometimes referred to as the "net
2.

personal casualty loss.

54

The restrictions on the deduction of a net

personal casualty loss are described below.
3. A taxpayer's net personal casualty loss is deductible only to the
extent that it exceeds io percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. 5 In addition, the deductible net personal casualty loss (i.e., the
amount in excess of io percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income) is characterized as an itemized deduction (but not as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction) and is thereby
subjected to the
56
limitations placed on that category of deductions.

48. A deduction for certain casualties was included in the first income tax act of 1913. Revenue

Act of 19I3, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 167 (1913).
49. Treas. Reg. § i.I65- 7 (b)(i) (as amended in 1977).
50. I.R.C. § 165(h)(3)(B) (2000).
51. Treas. Reg. § I.I6 5 -i(d)(2) (as amended in 1977).

52. I.R.C. § s65(h)(i).
of

53. "Personal casualty gain" is defined as any "recognized gain from any involuntary conversion
property... arising from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft."

Id. § I65 (h)(3)(A).
54.
casualty
55.
56.

I.R.C. § 165(h)(2) uses the term "net casualty loss," but I have chosen to use "net personal
loss" for greater clarity.
I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A).
I.R.C. § 67(b)(3).
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Returning to the situation that began this discussion in which a
taxpayer receives compensation for damaged property, the same
considerations that apply to a voluntary sale apply here as well. It is
appropriate that Congress excludes from income the amount of the
compensation that does not exceed the taxpayer's basis in the damaged
property, since that amount is properly characterized as a return of
capital. This exclusion conforms to the well-established principle that a
return of one's capital is not taxable. The damages received are not
income to the extent of the taxpayer's basis because the dollars received
are treated as a replacement of the dollars the taxpayer is deemed to
have invested in the property lost due to the casualty or theft. Since the
cash reimbursement effectively constitutes a withdrawal by the taxpayer
of that amount of his investment in the property, the taxpayer's basis is
reduced accordingly.57 That reduction does not constitute a deferral of
income because the value of the property has correspondingly declined.
If the taxpayer collects insurance for the damaged or stolen property
pursuant to an insurance contract, instead of receiving a payment from
the wrongdoer, the insurance proceeds are not included in income to the
extent of the taxpayer's basis unless the taxpayer had previously taken a
deduction for that loss."' Insurance proceeds are received pursuant to a
contract for reimbursement of a loss, and are not income to the extent
they merely replace the lost investment in the damaged or stolen
property. Since the insurance proceeds provide the taxpayer with cash in
hand in place of part or all of his investment in the property, the
taxpayer's basis in the property is reduced accordingly.
It is true that there is a superficial equivalence between excluding
the taxpayer's recovery and allowing a full deduction for the loss-a
deduction that is not allowed to unreimbursed taxpayers who are subject
to severe restrictions on deductibility. 9 However, as already noted, the
policy of excluding returns of capital is entrenched in the tax system, and
the conflicting principle of parallelism is not strong enough to outweigh
that policy. Similarly, in the view of Congress, the reason for denying a
full deduction to a casualty or theft loss, because of its points of contact
with personal consumption, outweighs the principle of parallelism, and
so the latter principle is not strong enough to justify allowing a full
57. See Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-I C.B. 76.

58. In their casebook, Professors Dodge, Fleming and Geier note that the receipt of insurance
proceeds raises some different considerations from those that apply to a tortfeasor's payments.
Nevertheless, they agree that the amount that does not exceed basis should be excluded, and I concur.
See DODGE ET AL., supra note 29, at 251-53.
59. A possible justification for imposing a limitation on the deduction of such losses is a concern
over the genuineness and extent of the claimed loss. I give little credence to that suggestion because
limitations are a poor vehicle for dealing with that concern-that is, the limitations are overinclusive in
that they also apply to genuine losses and are underinclusive in that they allow a deduction for an
improper claim to the extent that they exceed the statutory limits.
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deduction. One might disagree with the weight given by Congress to
those conflicting principles in choosing between them, but I do not see
how the congressional choice can be seen to be unreasonable. To the
contrary, although it is a difficult issue, I deem the congressional solution
to be a valid compromise between two polar positions.
B.

PHYSICAL INJURY

Returning now to the tax law's nonparallel treatment of taxpayers
who suffer physical injuries, which was noted earlier in this Article, you
will recall that compensatory damages received for a physical injury
generally are excluded from the income of the injured party by Code
section I04(a)(2), but no deduction is allowed an injured party for
uncompensated personal injuries.6' Is there a justification for that
treatment?
Initially, one might inquire as to what reasons there might be for
excluding compensatory damages for physical injuries from income. A
person typically has no basis (i.e., no dollar investment) in his bodily
parts;6 and so, if the same treatment that applies to compensation

received for damage to or loss of personal use property were adopted,
the entire amount of the compensation received for a physical injury
would be included in income. Congress has never stated its reasons for
providing an exclusion for physical injury damages, even though that
exclusion has been in the statutory tax law in one form or another since
1919
and has undergone congressional modifications from time to
time. 6' Commentators have speculated as to the likely reasons for that
exclusion, and I 65have adopted the following rationales that appear the
most persuasive.
6o. I find the case for some deduction stronger for loss of property due to theft than for casualty
losses. See Kahn, supra note 33, at 37-40.

61. If the injured party incurred, medical expenses, that amount can be deductible subject to
restrictions. I.R.C. § 213.
62. Moreover, a taxpayer has the burden of establishing his basis and it is doubtful that many
persons could satisfy that burden of proof in the case of human capital. In the unlikely event that a
taxpayer could prove that he had some basis in his human capital, but could not show the exact
amount, the taxpayer might be allowed a basis; but, even then, the amount likely would be minimal
after making all assumptions in favor of the government-an application of the so-called "Cohan
rule." See Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 193o); Estate of Goldstein v. Comm'r, 33 T.C. 1032,
1037-38 (196o).
63. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. 65-254, § 213 (b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, io66 (i919). The early history
of the statutory exclusion has been set forth in several articles. See, e.g., Margaret Henning, Recent
Developments in the Tax Treatment of PersonalInjury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAW.
783, 784-95 (1992).

64. In its most recent amendment in 1996, Congress limited the exclusion to compensatory
damages for physical injuries and made clear that punitive damages are taxable. Small Business
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-188, § 1605, iio Stat. 1755, 1838 (1996).
65. The rationales adopted in this Article were propounded in Douglas Kahn, Compensatory and
Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327,348-56 0995),
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The loss suffered from a physical injury is sometimes referred to as a
loss of "human capital." The physical attribute that was lost (e.g., a
damaged or severed limb, a loss of sight or hearing) is not something that
the victim normally would sell in a commercial market. In my view, the
tax law is aimed at commercial transactions; and its application to
noncommercial transactions should be viewed with some skepticism. If
income is received in a noncommercial transaction, the absence of a
commercial source is not sufficient to preclude the tax law from reaching
that income and taxing it. But, if there are other considerations favoring
an exclusion, the noncommercial nature of the transaction can be an
added factor weighing in favor of the exclusion. If a noncommercial
personal attribute is voluntarily placed in the commercial market, the tax
law should address it. But if a victim's noncommercial personal attribute
is involuntarily converted to cash because of a tort, then that event can
legitimately be viewed as outside of the commercial zone in which the tax
law typically operates and that fact combined with other considerations
that favor exclusion may be enough to justify it.
Obviously, while the view that there is a noncommercial zone in
which the tax law does not always operate is a datum favoring an
exclusion of compensatory damages for a physical injury, it disfavors
allowing a deduction for an uncompensated personal injury. This
disfavor of a deduction is a factor for not allowing one, but it is not
conclusive in itself, or even entitled to much weight. Deductions have
been allowed in other areas for noncommercial events, such as costs
incurred because of an illness or losses from a casualty to or theft of
personal use property.66 When there are competing considerations that
warrant taking a noncommercial event into account, the tax law
appropriately has done so. As we shall see, there are other stronger
reasons for denying the deduction. Let us first review the considerations
supporting an exclusion.
The tax law reflects a policy of allowing relief for taxpayers whose
property is involuntarily converted into cash. Code section 1033 permits
a deferral (or roll-over) of all or part of the income realized on an
involuntary conversion if property that is similar or related in service or
use to the converted property is purchased within a specified period of
time. In the case of a physical injury, however, it is not feasible for the
victim to purchase a replacement for what was lost. So, the approach
adopted for property in Code section 1033 is not available for physical
injuries. The exclusion from income of physical injury damages could be
the relief that Congress adopted given that the choice of a deferral
through a roll-over is not readily available for this type of involuntary
conversion. It is doubtful that concern over the involuntariness of the
66. I.R.C. §§ 213, 165(c)(3).
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conversion of the victim's personal attribute is sufficient by itself to
warrant granting an exclusion, but that consideration can be added to
others so that their cumulative effect is sufficient to induce Congress to
grant the exclusion.
Another consideration favoring exclusion is that taxing the victim on
compensatory damages might cause a dramatic increase in the amount of
damages awarded. Some of the added amount may not be collectible if it
exceeds insurance coverage. In any event, Congress may not wish to have
the tax laws be the engine that drives damage awards to dizzying heights.
Note that the concern over higher damage awards is not based on
sympathy for tortfeasors. An increase in damage awards would cause an
increase in insurance premiums that would be borne by much of the
public. Moreover, the insurers would take into account the possibility
that victims could be in high tax brackets, and that possibility would
further impact the premiums charged.
Another consideration is the appearance to the public that a tax on
such compensatory damages would have. It is difficult to determine the
dollar value of a lost personal attribute since personal attributes are not
bought and sold in the marketplace.67 Since the damaged or lost attribute
cannot be replaced, dollars are the only means of compensating the
victim, and the proper dollar substitute cannot be established with
precise and scientific accuracy. The dollar amount awarded is merely a
rough estimate of what will substitute for the loss that the victim
suffered. The compensation is intended to put the victim back in roughly
the same position he occupied before the accident, or as close to that as
dollars can accomplish. It would be unseemly, even rapacious, for the
government to take a portion of the funds that were given to make the
victim whole, and thereby leave the victim uncompensated for part of his
loss. The government does not wish to be seen as a cold-hearted creditor
capitalizing on the misfortune of others.
As noted above, if damage awards were made taxable, the amounts
awarded might be increased to provide greater relief to the victims.
However, it is unlikely that additional amounts will be awarded in all
cases, and the amount of an additional award in a specific case will not
necessarily be sufficient to offset the tax that the victim must pay.
But, is it not equally unseemly for the government to give no
deduction to a victim who is not compensated for her injury? Since the
victim has no dollar investment (i.e., no basis) in the lost attributes, there

67. The difficulty of valuing the loss incurred from an uncompensated physical injury is one factor
in not providing a deduction. While that difficulty is not a sufficient obstacle by itself to warrant
denying a deduction, it is one consideration to be added to others that weigh against allowing a
deduction.
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typically is nothing to deduct. 6 The failure to provide a deduction for
that loss does not have the rapacious character
69 that depriving a victim of
a significant portion of her compensation has.
A majority of the public likely would react adversely to the
government's seizing any of a victim's compensation, even though little
or no objection has been raised to the government's failure to provide
victims with a tax deduction. This difference in attitude and perception is
referred to as a "framing effect."7 For example, Professor Zelinsky has
suggested that the "framing effect" may explain why the publication of
so-called Tax Expenditure Budgets has had such little effect on the
adoption or maintenance of tax expenditures.' It would seem that even if
the view that exclusions are the equivalent of a deduction were
publicized, the public would not regard them as interchangeable. This
"framing effect" is a factor in the existence of many of the nonparallel
treatments of the tax law.
The tax law does not exclude all compensatory damages for personal
injuries. A victim of defamation or discrimination currently is taxed on
the damages received for his injuries, since he did not incur a physical
injury. Why has there not been a hue and cry raised in opposition to the
government's taking a significant portion of those damages? I believe the
explanation is that the public's depth of sympathy for a victim who
suffers a serious physical injury (such as a loss of a limb) is far greater
than it is for the victim of nonphysical injuries. That is not to say that
there is no sympathy for victims who incur nonphysical injuries, but only
that the depth of sympathy is far less. Moreover, the compensatory
damages received for nonphysical injuries are generally regarded as
68. There are instances in the Code where a taxpayer is allowed to take a deduction beyond his
investment. For example, the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct the fair market value of some types of
property donated to charity. On account of this rule, a taxpayer may deduct all or a portion of the
unrealized appreciation of an asset. See I.R.C. § 17o(e); Treas. Reg. § I.t7oA-(c). However, this is
clearly a subsidy provision intended to encourage charitable giving. See Kahn, supra note 33, at 46-47.
Another subsidy provision is the percentage depletion rules that, in some cases, allow a taxpayer to
take a deduction greater than his investment. See I.R.C. § 611. Even Congress expressed its concern
that the percentage depletion provision does not contribute to the accurate measurement of a
taxpayer's income by listing it as a tax preference item under the alternative minimum tax system.
I.R.C. § 57(a)(i).
69. Note that, subject to limitations, the Code does provide a deduction for any medical expenses
that the injured taxpayer incurs. I.R.C. § 213.
70. See Edward Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters,
Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradoxof Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAx REV. 797, 8o7-1 I
(2oo5). Professor Zelinsky cites other commentators who have noted the existence of a framing effect,
and he cites experiments that have demonstrated that that effect does exist. See also Edward J.
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framingand Taxation: Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household
Composition, 25 J. EcoN. PSYCH. 679 (2004), availableat www.sciencedirect.com.
71. Id. at 823. For a critical view of the tax expenditure concept, see Kahn, supra note 33; see also
Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical Review, 54 TAx NOTES
1661 (1992).
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substitutes for lost income, as contrasted to a damaged or lost body part.
The taking of even a significant portion of those damages does not have
the rapacious character of the taking of damages for physical injuries.
The cumulative effect of the several considerations described above
makes a compelling case for an exclusion." None of those considerations
apply to the granting of a deduction. But, parallelism is a principle that
does favor allowing a deduction, and so what considerations negate that
factor? To some extent, the noncommercial zone consideration disfavors
the allowance of a deduction, but not strongly so. Similarly, the
administrative difficulty in placing a dollar value on uncompensated
personal losses militates against allowing a deduction, but not
conclusively. The major reason that no deduction is allowed is that no
dollar investment was lost, and the goal of parallelism is not a strong
enough consideration to promote a deduction when there are no other
factors that favor it. This suggests that parallelism is not a major goal for
those who write the tax laws and that it is not a sufficient policy in itself
to affect tax decisions. Nonparallel treatment may offend those who like
a more tidy system, but it has been given little weight by tax policy
makers, and, in my view, justifiably so. The framing effect is one reason
that exclusions and deductions have not been regarded as identical so
that different tax treatment has not offended many. Consider the
example of the refund of the overpayment of an income tax that was
discussed earlier in this Article.73 The lack of parallel treatment in that
case is unlikely to offend more than a small minority of persons. That
suggests that while parallel treatment has an appeal in the abstract, it has
72. One problem with allowing the exclusion of compensatory physical injury damages is that, in
settling a dispute, the parties may characterize as compensatory damages payments made for an
entirely different purpose (this general issue can arise around any exclusion). For example, part of the
agreed-upon payment could represent punitive damages, which are included in income. I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2). The wrongdoer generally has little at stake in whether the damages are labeled
compensatory or punitive and thus may be willing to classify the entire amount as compensatory in

exchange for a lower overall payment. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 34, at 95-96. It may be difficult
to show that the payments were made for another purpose, but if the amount paid is obviously
excessive, the Service and the courts will recharacterize the payment and include some of it in income.
See Robinson v. Comm'r, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1997).
The possibility of false characterization of the nature of a payment is not limited to disguised
punitive damage payments. The entire settlement, or a portion thereof, could be made because of the
nuisance aspect of a claim, and so could be made to end a dispute and the bad publicity generated by
it. It is especially difficult to identify that situation, but in rare cases, a court may make that
determination and include part of the payment in income. See Amos v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2003-329.
Amos involved a photographer who was kicked during a basketball game by Dennis Rodman, a
professional basketball player. The Tax Court had to determine whether the $200,ooo settlement

between Rodman and the taxpayer was taxable to Amos or whether it was excluded as compensation
for a physical injury under Code section 104. This was an easy case for the Service to argue that a
portion, if not all, of the compensation paid to Amos should be taxable since the settlement contract
itself expressly provided that a portion of the proceeds was for the taxpayer's agreement to, among
other things, not defame Rodman or disclose the existence of the agreement. id.
73. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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little influence on the evaluation of specific provisions.
C.

CLARK V. COMMISSIONER

The third example of nonparallel treatment arises from a tax case,
rather than a Code provision. In fact, this is one area where, if the
Service were given a choice, it would likely opt to provide for parallel
treatment by denying an exclusion for the reimbursed taxpayer.
Clark v. Commissioner,7 a 1939 Board of Tax Appeals75 case,
involved a couple that, based on the advice of tax counsel, filed a joint
return for their 1932 tax year. In 1934, the Clarks were subject to an audit
and the Service contended that, based on errors in the return, the Clarks
owed over $30,000 in additional federal income taxes. After discovering
the error, the Clarks also learned that if they had filed separate returns,
rather than filing jointly, they would have owed almost $20,000 less in
income taxes; and they were not permitted to change their filing status.
The tax counsel who prepared the Clarks' return, admitting the
error, transferred to the Clarks an amount equal to the overpayment.
The Service contended that this payment was income to the Clarks. The
Clarks argued that the "payment constituted compensation for damages
or loss caused by the error of tax counsel, and that [they] therefore
realized no income from its receipt in I934. ''76
One interesting aspect of this case is that, whichever way the court
ruled, the policy would fail in some manner the principle of horizontal
equity. As set out in a hypothetical by Professors Klein, Bankman and
Shaviro in their casebook," assume we have three taxpayers. One
individual, A, hires a good tax preparer and therefore does not overpay
his income taxes. Another individual, B, hires a bad preparer, and
overpays by $io,ooo. Finally, a third individual, C, hires a bad preparer
and also overpays by $io,ooo. However, five years later, C noticed the
error and, like the Clark case, the preparer agreed to reimburse C for the
overpayment. If the $io,ooo payment is excluded from C's income, then
C will be treated similarly to A, i.e., it would be as if C had received good
advice from the beginning. However, such treatment would fail
horizontal equity when we compare B and C. By excluding the $io,ooo
payment, C and B are taxed equally even though C received $io,ooo
more income.
If we tax the payment to C, horizontal equity is met when we
compare B and C, but not when we compare C and A. Either C must be
74- 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. in result 1957-I C.B.4. The Service initially nonacquiesced in Clark

C.B. 45), but eighteen years later, chaiiged to an acquiesce.
75. The current Tax Court was originally known as the United States Board of Tax Appeals.
76. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 335. For a thorough analysis of the Clark case concluding that it was
correctly decided by the Board of Tax Appeals, see Zelenak, supra note 3.
77. KLEIN ET AL., supranote 8, at 123.
(1939-2
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overtaxed as compared to A or undertaxed as compared to B. While
discussing this hypothetical in their casebook, Professors Klein,
Bankman and Shaviro note: "We cannot avoid committing one or the
other of these two 'errors' (of the overall tax system, not the decisionmaker) given that [A] and [B] are not being taxed correctly relative to
each other." ' This scenario illustrates why horizontal equity often is not
a useful tool for policy analysis. The resolution of the question of equity
requires a determination of the party to whom the comparison is to be
made. In the above case, there is no reason to favor either A or B as the
proper object of comparison, and yet equality cannot be obtained with
both unless a deduction were allowable for a tax overpayment. There are
good reasons not to allow a deduction for tax overpayments.79
The court in Clark held for the taxpayer,"' thereby choosing the
"error" that Clark was undertaxed as compared to others who overpaid
but were not able to recover anything from their preparer. This decision
created nonparallel treatment for these types of expenditures. That is,
the court provided an exclusion if the taxpayer is reimbursed for their
overpayment, but no deduction is allowable if the taxpayer is not
reimbursed.
The Service, although it did acquiesce to the Clark decision,8'
subsequently attempted to narrow the scope of the case as much as
possible. For example, in 1992, the Service published Private Letter
Ruling (PLR) 9211015. The ruling described a fact pattern where,
because of a CPA firm's negligence, an investment fund failed to qualify
as a regulated investment company (RIC) for certain tax years. This
failure led to the investment fund's paying higher federal income taxes as
well as other penalties and interest. The fund was reimbursed by the
CPA's insurer for those expenses. The issue was whether this
reimbursement was income to the investment fund.
The Service described the issue as whether the reimbursement was a
recovery of lost profits and therefore taxable to the fund or a
replacement of the fund's capital which would not be includible in
income. As noted by the Service, "[playment by the one causing a loss
that does no more than restore a taxpayer to the position he or she was
in before the loss was incurred is not includible in gross income because
there is no economic gain."'8' The Service then concluded that this
78. Id.; see also Zelenak, supra note 3, at 388-89.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 29 and 30 (hypothetical involving taxpayer Y).
8o. The court's decision in Clark seems to rely on cases that were later repudiated but the result
in the case could be justified on a different ground which may have led to the Service's eventual
acquiescence. Clark, 40 B.T.A. at 333.

81. 1957-1 C.B. 4; see also Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-I C.B. 45 (excluding a reimbursement of tax
overpayment caused by a tax preparer's error).
82. PLR92111o5.
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reimbursement should be classified as a return of capital and ruled that
the investment fund would not have to include the amount in income.8 3
However, in 1997, the Service reversed its position. In a new ruling,
the Service specifically revoked its earlier ruling in PLR 9211015.4
Attempting to distinguish Clark, the Service stated:
The indemnity payment that Fund received as a reimbursement for the
additional federal income taxes and associated penalties and interest it
incurred are distinguishable from the indemnity payments in Clark...
the preparers' error in filing returns or claiming refunds caused the
taxpayer to pay more than their minimum proper federal income tax
liabilities based on the underlying transactions for the year in question.
In this case, however, the CPA firm's error altered the underlying
entity status of Fund, and Fund incurred the minimum proper federal
income tax liability as a Subchapter C corporation during the period it
did not qualify as a RIC. The CPA firm's reimbursement.., was not
made to compensate Fund for a tax liability in excess of Fund's proper
federal tax liability for the tax years relating to the firm's negligence.
Instead, 8 the reimbursement was a payment of Fund's proper tax
liability.
This reasoning is weak, at best. The Clarks also paid the correct
amount of liability according to their filing status, although it is true that
the accountant's error in Clark did not change the underlying structure
of the Clark family. In the PLR, two adverse parties determined that the
accountant's mistake caused the taxpayer to overpay its federal tax
liability. While qualifying as a RIC may have required the taxpayer to
incur expenses that it did not pay on account of the mistake, that fact
merely should have reduced the size of the taxpayer's damage and
accordingly reduced the amount of the accountant's liability. If the
parties neglected to take any such additional expenses into account in
setting the amount to be paid, it nevertheless should not affect the tax
treatment of the payment by the CPA firm's insurer because the amount
of damages was set by parties at arm's length and should be respected by
the Service.
In my opinion, the Clark reasoning should also apply to the PLR
facts. The accountant is simply repaying the taxpayer for lost capital
based on the accountant's error. This should be treated similarly to
payments made for causing damage to property; that is, unless and until
the accountant's payment exceeds the taxpayer's "basis" in his tax
payment (i.e., the amount that the taxpayer paid), the payment by the
83. Id.
84. PLR 9743035; see also PLR 9833007.

85. PLR 9743035; see also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (r929) (a person's
payment of a taxpayer's tax liability is income to the taxpayer); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (same).
86. To the extent that the payment represented interest on the accountant's obligation or was a
return of a previously deducted item (such as the accountant's fee) it would be taxable. Rev. Rul.
57-47, 1957-I C.B. 23.
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accountant should be treated similarly to a return of capital and thus
nontaxable. That is not to say that the taxpayer actually has a "basis."
One can have a basis only in non-cash tangible or intangible property.
But, basis is comprised of dollars that have been invested; and so the
replacement of dollars is equivalent to a replacement of basis, both of
which represent a return of capital.
Professor Zelenak maintains, in his article on Clark, 7 that a
reimbursement of income tax liability can be excluded only to the extent
that the tax payment can be classified as a "loss." He maintains that
otherwise the repayment is taxable under the Old Colony8' doctrine. I do
not agree that the taxpayer's tax payment has to be classified as a loss in
order for the reimbursement to be excluded. Rather, in my view, it is
sufficient that the party making the reimbursement (the accountant 8, in
the letter ruling) made an error that caused the taxpayer to pay out
dollars that he would not have had to pay if the accountant had not made
an error. It is sufficient that there is a nexus between the third party's
error and the amount of payment that was reimbursed. It should not
matter that the taxpayer actually owed the tax he paid; the significant
fact is that the third party's error caused the taxpayer to have a greater
tax liability than if the third party had not made the error.
Consider this example. B owes a fine to the state of X that is due to
be paid on a specified date. A fine is not a deductible expense.' B's
attorney, T, holds a sizeable amount of B's funds in a fiduciary account.
B requests T to use some of those funds to pay the fine, and T
undertakes to make a timely payment to the state. T fails to make the
payment on time, and so B is fined an additional $20,000 for late
payment. The additional fine is not deductible.' B properly owes the
additional fine to the state. Because the additional fine was attributable
to T's error, T reimburses B for the additional $20,000 fine that B
incurred. The fact that B was liable for the additional fine should not
cause the reimbursement to be income to B. The reimbursement is
replacing dollars that B would not have had to pay to the state if T had
done his job properly.
PLR 9728052 presents a variation on this theme. In that ruling, the
taxpayer had agreed upon a settlement with his former wife to pay her an
annual amount for a specified number of years. The settlement
agreement provided that if the wife died before the payment period
expired, the taxpayer would continue to make payments to her estate.
87. Zelenak, supra note 3.
88. Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. 716.
89. While the reimbursement was made by the accountant's insurer, it was made on behalf of the
accountant.
o
9 . I.R.C. § 162(f) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-I(p) (2000).
i
9 . I.R.C. § 162(f).
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This provision disqualified the payments made to the wife for alimony
treatment and made them nondeductible.92 The taxpayer agreed to this
settlement on the erroneous advice of his attorney that the payments to
the wife would be deductible. The taxpayer sought indemnification from
the attorney's malpractice insurer for the additional taxes he incurred,
and will incur in the future, because of the disallowance of the deduction
that he had anticipated receiving. The Service ruled that since the
taxpayer properly owes the taxes in question, any indemnification he
receives from the attorney's insurer will be included in his income.
Presumably, the taxpayer would not have executed an agreement
providing for post mortem benefits to the wife if he had been correctly
advised as to the tax consequences of that provision. However, the wife
likely would have rejected an agreement without that provision unless
the amount of the annual payments was increased. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine just how much the attorney's error cost the
taxpayer since one can only speculate as to what the terms of the final
settlement would have been. In determining the amount of the
taxpayer's damages, any additional amounts that the taxpayer would
have had to pay should be offset against the additional tax liability he
incurred. In my view, however, whatever figure the taxpayer and the
attorney's insurer agree upon, regardless of whether it reflects offsetting
costs that the taxpayer might have incurred, should be accepted by the
Service because it will be the product of an arm's length agreement.
There is no risk of collusion in this circumstance, and the bona fides of
such an agreement are beyond question since the insurer has no extrinsic
motives (such as silencing the bad publicity that a dispute would bring to
the attorney) for settling the issue.93
In his article about the Clark issue, Professor Zelenak also discusses
the question of how a tax reimbursement payment that is made pursuant
to a tax indemnity agreement should be treated, and concludes that such
payments should be taxed. 9' While accepting much of what Professor
Zelenak said in that article, I come to a different conclusion. A tax
indemnity agreement is a guarantee of the tax treatment that a taxpayer
will have in a transaction and an agreement to indemnify the taxpayer for
any additional taxes incurred if the actual tax treatment is different from
the one that was promised. A tax indemnity agreement can be granted in
several distinct circumstances. It can be given by a seller to induce a
buyer or investor to enter into a transaction. Or, a third party, such as a
broker or promoter, could provide a prospective buyer with a tax

Id. § 7I(b)(i)(D).
93. Even if the payment were made directly by the attorney, the possibility of collusion or ulterior
motive is not significant enough to change the tax result.
94. Zelenak, supra note 3, at 397.
92.
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indemnity agreement for the same purpose. Indeed, an insurance
company that has no connection to the investment could ensure that the
taxpayer will receive a specified tax treatment. 95 Since Professor Zelenak
focuses on a seller's indemnification agreement, I will discuss that
situation first.
The Service currently treats tax indemnification payments that a
taxpayer receives as income to the taxpayer, and Professor Zelenak
concluded that the Service is correct in doing so.96 He argues that the
additional tax that the taxpayer paid cannot be characterized as a loss
because that would permit "private parties to manufacture a 'loss' out of
nothing, with no regard to the actual nature of the asset in question,
through the simple means of misrepresentation by the seller."'97 He points
out that to exclude the tax reimbursement from income is to permit the
parties to provide the investor with a tax-free return on his investment,
thereby providing a benefit to the seller or the investor or both that they
could not otherwise obtain. Before examining that contention, let us
focus on the nature of a tax reimbursement payment.
As previously discussed, when a taxpayer receives a reimbursement
from the person who caused the taxpayer to pay a higher tax through
that person's error, the payment should be excluded from the taxpayer's
income as a damage payment to replace lost dollars. The situation is
analogous to the receipt of damages for injury to property where the
amount received is excluded from income to the extent it does not
exceed the taxpayer's basis, albeit the taxpayer's basis is reduced by the
reimbursement if the taxpayer still has the asset. 98 But, a payment
received pursuant to a tax indemnification agreement is on quite a
different footing. Such a payment does not constitute damages paid for
causing an injury. Instead, the payment is made under a contractual
arrangement. How should that contractually mandated payment be
treated for tax purposes? Let us first consider the case of a sellerprovided indemnification, and then consider a third party
indemnification.
The payment that the taxpayer receives from the seller is made
pursuant to a guarantee of the seller that was designed to induce the
taxpayer to make the investment. In effect, the seller became an insurer,
and the payment to the taxpayer can be seen as insurance proceeds. If a
taxpayer who owned automobile insurance has his personal use
automobile destroyed in a storm, and if the taxpayer does not qualify for

95.
96.
97.
98.

See infra note lo8.
Id.
Zelenak, supranote 3, at 398.
There is no meaningful reduction of the taxpayer's basis if the asset in question was destroyed

or was stolen and never recovered.
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a casualty deduction because of insurance coverage, the insurance
proceeds that are paid to the taxpayer are nevertheless excluded from his
income to the extent of his basis in the automobile.' The "insurance"
proceeds received under a tax indemnity contract should be treated
similarly-i.e., they should be excluded from income to the extent they
do not exceed the dollars that were "lost" by the taxpayer because of the
additional tax payment.
Alternatively, the tax indemnity agreement can be viewed as an
agreement by the seller to reduce the purchase price in the event the tax
treatment of the transaction is different from what the parties
anticipated. In the case of a seller-provided tax indemnity, the reduction
of purchase price characterization seems to be a better view than the
insurance analogy, since that is the true consequence of the seller's
refunding part of the purchase price to the purchaser. The additional tax
that the purchaser had to pay is merely the measuring standard for the
amount of purchase price to be refunded.
Regardless of which characterization is chosen, if the
indemnification payment is excluded from the taxpayer's income, it will
reduce the cost of the transaction to him, which will mean a reduction of
his basis or of his expenses.
Consider this analogous situation. K wishes to purchase a house as
his personal residence, but deems the asking price to be too high because
he will have to make extensive repairs if he purchases the house. The
seller induces K to purchase the house by guaranteeing that the repairs
will not exceed $20,000. K purchases the house, and makes the repairs
which cost $35,000. The seller then pays K $I5,000 pursuant to the

guarantee. K does not have income because of the receipt of that
payment. The payment is a reduction of the cost of the house to K, and
so reduces his basis.1 "
In his article,' °' contrary to the analysis above, Professor Zelenak
makes a strong case for taxing tax indemnification payments that are
made by a seller. He illustrated the objectionable feature of an exclusion
from income by the following example.' 2
X wishes to sell its bond to F (the issuing of a bond is a form of
borrowing money). The bond will pay $ioo on maturity. F will buy X's
bond for $ioo only if it will provide F with a io% return after taxes. All

99. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The payments will reduce the taxpayer's basis in
the automobile; but since the car was destroyed, the reduction of the taxpayer's basis has no
significance.
oo. The reduction of basis may not be of any consequence because of the exclusion from income
provided by I.R.C. § 121 for a specified amount of gain on the sale of a principal residence.
ioI. Zelenak, supra note 3.
102. Id. at 398-99.
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of Fs income will be taxed at a flat 20% rate. 3 If the interest payable on
the bond is taxable, X could meet Fs demand by providing an annual
payment of $12.50 on the bond, which would provide F with an after-tax
return of $io. I4 X would thereby pay 12.5% on the bond, and F would
net a io% return after taxes.
Instead, X issues Fa bond for $ioo that pays F only $io per year, but
X guarantees that the interest payments will not be included in Fs
income. If the interest is taxed by the Service, X will reimburse F for any
tax he incurs. The interest F received is taxed, and F pays a tax of $2 per
year thereon. Pursuant to the indemnification agreement, X pays F $2
per year. If the $2 indemnification payment that F receives is excluded
from his income, F will have his desired io% after-tax return; but
Professor Zelenak states that the cost to X will be only $12 per year ($io
interest plus the $2 indemnification). So, instead of X's paying 12.5% on
the bond, Xwill pay only 12%.
If, instead, the $2 indemnification payment to F were taxable, X
would have to pay F $2.50 to provide F with $2 after taxes. In that case, X
would pay the same 12.5% that X would have paid if X had
acknowledged from the beginning that the interest on the bond would be
taxable.
In fact, however, even if the tax indemnification payments are
excluded from income, X may have to pay more than 12% on the bond.
If excluded from income, each $2 indemnification payment made to F
will reduce Fs basis in the bond.0 5 When the bond matures (unless F dies
before then so that the basis of the bond will be stepped up under Code
section IO4), F will recognize gain on the difference between the $ioo
proceeds that F will receive and Fs adjusted basis in the bond. Pursuant
to the indemnification agreement, X will then pay F the amount of tax
that F incurred on that gain. That additional payment by X will increase
the total amount it pays on the bond to constitute an annualized rate of
something more than 12% of the original $ioo purchase price. This
potential additional cost to X does not eliminate the tax advantages of
the arrangement, but it does reduce them.
Note that the tax benefit created by the above-described
arrangement need not be captured exclusively by the seller. The benefit
could be divided between the parties by the seller's paying a slightly
higher interest rate on the bond. That possibility increases the risk that
parties will enter into a collusive arrangement to take advantage of this
tax reduction.

103. An unrealistic assumption that is adopted for the sake of simplicity.

104. Eighty percent of $12.50 is $io.
1O5. Under a transaction analysis, the payment is a reduction of the price that F paid for the bond
and thus reduces his basis. See supra text accompanying note too.
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What does this problem tell us about the question of whether tax
indemnification payments by sellers should be excluded from income?
Not all seller indemnification agreements are vulnerable to this abuse.
Does the fact that some agreements will provide a tax benefit, and that
some parties will make a tax indemnification arrangement in bad faith to
obtain a tax benefit, mean that all seller-made tax indemnity payments
should be taxed?
The answer to that question is in doubt. The problem, so ably
described by Professor Zelenak, shows that there is a strong policy
reason to tax such indemnification payments. While it might be possible
to distinguish potentially abusive indemnification arrangements from
those that are not, that would impose a great burden on the Service to
identify the different situations. The better rule is to apply the same
approach to all seller-made tax indemnification agreements-either tax
the payments or exclude them.
On the other hand, the problem described by Professor Zelenak,
while a significant consideration, is only one of several factors to be
considered. There also exist strong reasons not to tax the indemnification
payments and to treat them as a reduction of the purchaser's basis-i.e.,
the transactional view that the arrangement constitutes a reduction of the
purchase price, and the insurance analogy. Perhaps, the issue should be
resolved on the basis of empirical studies to determine whether the
potential abuse of the arrangement actually occurs to a significant
extent. -°6
Note that the possibility of abusive manipulation by parties to obtain
tax benefits is mitigated by the vulnerability of such arrangements to be
struck down as shams. "7 The difficulty the Service would encounter in
identifying and prosecuting those arrangements that are shams renders
that remedy of less practical value. But, if the occurrences of sham
transactions are rare, disregarding them may be adequate.
Let us now turn to consider a tax indemnity provision that is made
by a third party (a broker for example) rather than by a seller.'8 There
io6. It would be difficult to determine the extent to which sham transactions are taking place
because of the secretive nature of such transactions. But, at the present time, it is not possible to
obtain any empirical information since the Service's position that tax indemnity payments are taxable
has not been challenged.
107. A sham transaction has been defined as one that: (i)has no business purpose other than
obtaining tax benefits, and (2) has no economic substance because no reasonable prospect of profit
exists. Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).
iO8. There are two types of parties who may be willing to make an indemnification agreement.
First, there is a promoter who has an interest in seeing that the deal is accomplished. Second, there is a
third-party insurance provider who may examine a proposed deal and provide tax indemnity insurance
(sometimes referred to as transaction tax risk insurance). See Kylie D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty
and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339 (2005); see also Kenneth A. Geary, New
Opportunitiesfor Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (2004). Professor Logue
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seems to be no potential for abuse in that case, and so the
indemnification payments should be excluded from income. In most
cases, the payments will reduce the taxpayer's basis or reduce expenses
the taxpayer incurred.
Return to the hypothetical above where a buyer was induced to
purchase a residence by a guarantee that necessary repairs would not
exceed $20,000. In the hypothetical, the guarantee was made by the
seller. Instead, change the facts so that the guarantee was made by the
real estate agent with whom the house was listed. The repairs actually
cost $35,000, and so the real estate agent pays the buyer $I5,ooo pursuant
to the indemnification agreement. In my view, the payment will not be
included in the buyer's income, but it will reduce his basis in the house.
Consider the Tax Court's decision in Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
Commissioner."'9 In that case, the taxpayer was induced by a broker to
purchase four businesses even though the taxpayer did not wish to own
one of them. The broker convinced the taxpayer to make the purchase
by promising to sell the unwanted business or to pay the taxpayer
$ioo,ooo if the broker were unable to make the sale. The broker was
unable to make the sale, and so paid $ioo,ooo to the taxpayer per its
guarantee. The court treated the $ioo,ooo payment as a reduction of the
purchase price paid by the taxpayer for the business, and so excluded it
from income. While it is unusual for a payment by a third party to be
treated as a reduction of the purchase price paid to another, the broker
was so connected to the purchase of the business that the court deemed
his payment to the taxpayer as part of the overall purchase transaction.
This approach could well apply to the scenario concerning K's purchase
of a residence described above"' so that K's basis in the house would be
reduced by the $15,ooo payment he received.
Returning to the tax indemnity payment, it seems that the payment
might reduce the taxpayer's basis in an investment that was the subject of
the arrangement or it might reduce costs that the taxpayer incurred in
the program, but it would not be taxable income to the taxpayer when
received. In short, it should be treated the same as an insurance
payment.' The question is whether the payment should be treated as a
return of part of the taxes the taxpayer paid, which would have no effect
on the taxpayer's basis in any property, or whether it should be treated as
briefly mentioned the tax treatment issue (both in terms of whether the premiums are deductible and
whether the proceeds are excluded). Logue, supra, at 383 n.86. Professor Logue did not resolve the
question of whether the receipt of insurance proceeds in such cases will be income to the insured, and
he characterized that as a difficult issue. Id.
109.

3 6T.C.M.

1755 (i977).

i xo. See text preceding note ioo.
i i 1. A payment by an insurer pursuant to an insurance contract should be given the same tax
treatment-i.e., not income to the insured.
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a reduction of the amount of the taxpayer's investment or costs incurred
in the transaction that he was induced to undertake? The purpose of the
broker's indemnity agreement was to induce the taxpayer to engage in a
transaction, and so the payment can be seen as a reduction of the costs
the taxpayer incurred in that transaction. That approach would conform
to the Tax Court's decision in the Freedom Newspapers case described
above."2
An alternative characterization of the payment is to treat it as a
reduction of any fee the payor may have received from the taxpayer in
the transaction. If so, the payment would be income to the taxpayer only
to the extent that the taxpayer had previously deducted the fLe (that is,
income under the tax benefit rule)." 3 This characterization would be
proper if the guarantee made by the payor was a sham, and the parties
knew from the outset that the payment would be made."4 If the
guarantee was bona fide (i.e., not a sham), it is a close question which of
the two possible characterizations is better. In my view, the better
characterization is to treat the guarantee as an insurance arrangement,
especially if it were possible for the amount subject to the guarantee to
exceed the payor's fee."5
If the payment is treated as insurance proceeds, it would seem to be
a deductible expense of the payor, provided that the guarantee met the
ordinary and necessary standard of business deductions." 6 Would it be
erroneous to allow the payor a deduction and yet have no corresponding
income to the taxpayer? In my view, that is not an error. An insurance
company that made a payment on a damage claim can deduct its
payment even though it is not income to the person who received the
payment.
In conclusion, reimbursements should be excluded from income
when they are paid for additional taxes that were incurred because of the
payor's error regardless of whether the error was made in preparing the
tax return. If the reimbursement is made pursuant to a tax indemnity
agreement of a third party, it should be excluded from income; but, the
112. 36 T.C.M. 1755; cf. Johnson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 896 (976),
court, 574 F.2d 189 (1978).
113. I.R.C. § Il1

affid per curiam by a divided

(2000).

114. This is merely an application of the sham transaction doctrine.
115. Preferring the characterization of the indemnification payment as an insurance payment
rather than as a reduction of the broker's fee may appear to be inconsistent with my preference for the
characterization of a seller's indemnification as a reduction of the purchase price rather than as
insurance. However, I believe that the different circumstances of those two situations warrant different
characterizations. In any event, if the broker's fee is not deductible, it may well be treated as part of
the purchaser's cost of the property. If so, a characterization of the indemnification payment as a
reduction of the broker's fee will reduce the purchaser's basis, and thus will have the same tax effect as
would an insurance payment.
116. I.R.C. § 162(a).
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reimbursement may reduce a taxpayer's costs in acquiring assets or
engaging in a transaction. If the reimbursement is made pursuant to a tax
indemnity agreement of a seller, it is a difficult question as to whether it
should be taxed because of the problem that Professor Zelenak
described. In my view, unless empirical evidence demonstrates that the
problem Professor Zelenak describes is extensive, the indemnification
payments should be excluded.
D.

EMPLOYEE BUSINESS EXPENSES

Federal income tax deductions can be divided into several
categories. First, they can be either itemized or nonitemized deductions.
Nonitemized deductions are deducted from an individual taxpayer's
gross income to determine the individual's adjusted gross income. In
general, there are no limitations on the amount of an individual's
nonitemized deductions. Most nonitemized deductions are those listed in
Code section 62(a), but a few nonitemized deductions are listed instead
in other Code sections."7 All deductions that are not nonitemized, other
than the deductions for personal exemptions, are itemized deductions. 8
Itemized deductions can be deducted only if neither the taxpayer
nor the taxpayer's spouse elects to use a standard deduction."9 In
addition, all but three of the itemized deductions are subject to an overall
limitation that applies if the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds a
specified amount. ° This overall limitation is scheduled to be phased out
temporarily beginning in the year 2006, but is scheduled to return in full
force in 2011. I" ' In addition to the general limitations that apply, certain
itemized deductions have specific limitations that apply only to that
deduction.'
A subcategory of itemized deductions, referred to as "miscellaneous
itemized deductions," are subjected to an additional limitation.' 3 All
117. For example, I.R.C. §§ 7I(f)(t)(B) (excess alimony payments), 164(f) (self-employment
taxes) and 165(h)( 4 )(A) (personal casualty losses that do not exceed the taxpayer's personal casualty
gains) are nonitemized deductions that are not listed in I.R.C. § 62(a).
18. Id. § 63(d) (2o00).
i19. Id. § 63(b), (c)(6)(A). The standard deduction is a specified dollar amount allowable to
individuals in lieu of their itemized deductions. Id. § 63(b), (c), (f). Thus, an individual can either take
his itemized deductions or a standard deduction, but cannot take both. On the other hand, an
individual can take all of his nonitemized deductions even if he elects to use the standard deduction.
120. Id. § 68(a). Initially, the threshold specified amount was $Ioo,ooo, but it is adjusted annually
for inflation. Id. § 68(b). For the year 2005, the threshold amount is $145,95o. Rev. Proc. 2004-71,
2004-50 I.R.B. 970. The three itemized deductions that are excluded from this overall limitation are:
medical expenses, investment interest, and certain losses. I.R.C. § 68(c).
121. I.R.C. § 68(f), (g); Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
122. For example, medical expenses can be deducted only to the extent that they exceed a
percentage of the individual's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a).
123. Id. § 67(a).
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itemized deductions that are not listed in Code section 67(b) are
miscellaneous itemized deductions.' 4 The total of an individual's
miscellaneous itemized deductions for a taxable year can be deducted
only to the extent that the total exceeds 2% of the individual's adjusted
gross income for that year.'25 This 2% of adjusted gross income floor is in
addition to all other limitations that apply to the deduction. In addition,
miscellaneous itemized deductions are not deductible at all when the
taxpayer is subject to the alternative minimum tax. 12 6 If the alternative
minimum tax system is not amended, it is predicted that by 2010, onethird of the total number of taxpayers will be taxed under the alternative
minimum tax system rather than the "regular" system.'27
Subject to a few exceptions, ' unreimbursed business expenses of an
employee are itemized deductions.' 9 Since the itemized deduction for
employee business expenses is not listed in Code section 6 7 (b), it is a
miscellaneous itemized deduction. On the other hand, to the extent that
an employee's business expense is reimbursed by the employer, the
deduction for that expense is a nonitemized deduction that is not subject
to any limitations."'3 Indeed, since the nonitemized deduction for the
expense will wash out the inclusion of the reimbursement in the
employee's gross income, the Service simplifies the reporting of those
items by allowing the employee, instead of deducting the expense, simply
to exclude the reimbursement from income. This alternative exclusion
from income is allowed only if the employee is required to account to the
employer, and does so.'3 '
Employee business expenses then are another example of
nonparallel treatment by the Code. Is there a justification for treating
employees whose business expenses are reimbursed by their employer
more favorably than employees who bear the expense themselves? The
difference can be nothing more than formulaic-i.e., in some cases, it
124. Id. § 67(b).
125. Id. § 67(a).
126. Id. § 5 6(b)(I)(A)(i).
127. GREGG
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(2003).

128. Certain expenses connected with an employee's claim based on discrimination are
nonitemized deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a)(I9). Certain business expenses of qualified performing artists,
a state official, members of reserve components of the armed forces, and up to $250 of specified
expenses of eligible educators are nonitemized deductions, and so are not subject to the limitations
that apply to itemized deductions. Id. § 62(a)(2)(B)-(E). The provision for the deduction of a limited
amount of educators' expenses is scheduled to expire in 20o6. Id. § 62(a)(2)(D) (as amended by
§ 307(a) of the Working Families Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, sec. 307(a), § 62, i18 Stat.
s166, 1179 (2004)). Employees can also take a nonitemized deduction for qualified moving expenses.
i.R.C. § 62(a)(15).
129. I.R.C. § 62(a)(I), (2).
130. Id.
131. Treas. Reg. § i.i62-i7(b)(i) (2000).
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merely reflects the manner in which the employer and employee have
chosen to characterize their arrangement. Take the example of a college
professor, X, who accepts a teaching visit at another college for an
academic year, consisting of nine months. X will return to his home
school when the nine-month period is finished. Since X is away from
home temporarily, his living expenses at the visiting school, including his
lodging, will constitute deductible business expenses under Code section
162(a)(2).

However, only one-half of his expenses for meals are

deductible.'32 In negotiating his salary at the visiting school, X requests
and receives a larger salary to compensate for the extra living expenses
he will incur. All of X's salary, including the added amount, is included in
X's gross income. While X's living expenses (including one-half of the
cost of his meals) are deductible, they are miscellaneous itemized
deductions; because of the limitations on those deductions, X will obtain
little or no benefit from them. However, if X does not seek a higher
salary and, instead, obtains an agreement from the visiting school to
reimburse X for all or part of his living expenses (or to pay some of those
expenses directly), all of the reimbursed expenses, including ioo% of the
cost of his meals,'33 will be nonitemized deductions that are fully
deductible. Alternatively, if X accounts to the visiting school (his
employer) for his reimbursed expenses, he can simply exclude the
reimbursement from his income.'34 Whatever may be the proper tax
treatment of all employee business expenses, there is no justification for
such dramatic differences in the tax treatment of employees based on
such a substantively meaningless distinction, especially when the result
can easily be manipulated by knowledgeable taxpayers. '
In a prior article, I criticized the Code's imposition of restrictions on
employee business expenses,' 36 and only a summary of some of that
discussion will be repeated in this piece. Several commentators, including
myself, have questioned whether there is a justification for imposing
general restrictions on itemized deductions.'37 Regardless of whether the
current treatment of itemized and miscellaneous itemized deductions is
proper, unreimbursed employee expenses should not be included in the
132. I.R.C. § 274(n).
133. Without the reimbursement, only fifty percent of the cost of the meals would have been

deductible as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. Id. The fifty percent limitation would apply to the
deduction allowable to the school for its reimbursement of the employee's meal; but since the school is
a nonprofit organization, deductions are of no consequence to it.
134. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
135. For a numerical example illustrating the large tax difference, see Kahn, supra note 2, at 21-25.
136. Id. at 20-25.
137. Id. at 29-53; Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual
Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415 (2o01); see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax
Reform for Fairnessand Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fendfor Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 459,

493 0993).
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list of those deductions.
Let us focus on the justifications offered for the miscellaneous
itemized deduction provision since that is the principal restriction on
deductibility and since those also seem to be the justifications for any
restrictions on itemized deductions. Four justifications have been
suggested'38: (I) reducing administrative burdens for the Service and the
taxpayer for the treatment of small amounts that do not warrant that
time and expense; (2) some of the included items have elements of
personal expenditures and would have been incurred even if no business
purpose had also been present; (3) taxpayers make errors in reporting
itemized deductions; and (4) the government needs the additional
revenue that the imposition of the limitations will bring. In a prior article,
I dealt with each of those purported
justifications and concluded that
39
they do not justify the restrictions.'
As to the first justification of administrative burden, while the
provision will ease the record-keeping burden of some taxpayers, it will
do little for prudent taxpayers who will retain records of those expenses
since they will not know until the end of the year whether they will
benefit from itemizing their deductions. 40 While the limitations on
employee business expenses will ease the Service's auditing burden by
removing those items from many taxpayers' returns, there are offsetting
auditing burdens created by the provision because some individuals will
seek classification as independent contractors, rather than as employees,
in order to escape the imposition of those limitations. The Service will
have to determine whether independent contractor classification is
proper, and may have to litigate that issue.'4 '
The second justification-that many miscellaneous itemized
deductions have substantial personal elements-is equally true of
business expenses of the self-employed and of reimbursed employee
expenses. One reason for preferring reimbursed employee expenses is
the assertion that the employer will reimburse an employee for any
138. The first three of these justifications are suggested in STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAXATION,
1OOTH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 78-79 (Comm. Print 1987).
The fourth is suggested by some commentators. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering
Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531, 533 (2000).
139. Kahn, supra note 2, at 40-53.
140. See Peroni, supra note 137, at 1418. Contra Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for Individual
Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 167 n.235 (1989) ("The floor is high enough
that most taxpayers no longer keep records."). If Professor Schenk is correct, it is likely that some of
those taxpayers would have been entitled to itemized deductions if they had kept records, and a
system which discourages record-keeping to the detriment of some taxpayers could be viewed as
undesirable.
141. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 41-43; see also Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver:
"Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REV. 505, 527
(1987) ("[B]enefits must be offset by the complexity and manipulation created by plans to avoid the
new floor.").
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legitimate business expense. But, many employers do not reimburse
employee expenses because they do not wish to undertake the
administrative burden of maintaining a reimbursement plan; instead
those employers pay their employees a higher salary and leave the
administration of the costs to the employees.' 42 Another contention is
that an employer will oversee the legitimacy of expenses it reimburses,
but that will not apply to an employee of a corporation in which the
employee has a controlling interest (i.e., a closely held corporation). 43
Moreover, many legitimate business expenses of self-employed
individuals also have elements of personal enjoyment that accompany
them, but those expenses have not been subjected to the restrictions
applied to employee expenses. Also, many employers reimburse
employee's travel expenses by providing the employee with a per diem
allowance for which no accounting is made to the employer, and yet
those employee expenses are nonitemized deductions.'"
The third justification-that taxpayers make errors in reporting
deductions-is subject to three responses: (i) errors are made in many
parts of a tax return, and there is no reason to single out employee
business expenses as being more prone to error than other items; (2) not
everyone makes mistakes, and it is harsh to punish the innocent for the
errors of others; and (3) creating a floor for the deduction is not an
adequate solution since those with large amounts of such items that are
properly deductible can still make an error in taking an unwarranted
deduction of a small item.
The fourth justification of raising revenue can apply to any provision
that raises tax costs, and revenue can be raised with provisions that do
not distinguish taxpayers on such a formulaic basis.
In sum, the lack of parallel treatment (and resulting violation of
horizontal equity) is egregious in this case because the difference
between those who do and do not qualify for a deduction can be so
nominal as to make the distinction arbitrary and opens the way to
manipulation. While manipulation is not available to all employees, it
worsens the case for the restrictive treatment of employee expenses
when some employees can easily avoid those restrictions while others
cannot.
The question is whether the justifications for distinguishing
unreimbursed employee expenses outweigh the lack of parallel
treatment. In this case, the goal of parallelism is especially strong given
the manner in which the limitations can be so easily circumvented by an
arrangement between an employee and his employer. On the other side,
Peroni, supra note 137, at 1422.
143. McMahon, supra note 137, at 493.
I44. Treas. Reg. § 1.62-iT(e)(i) (as amended in 199o).
142.
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the justifications for different tax treatment do not hold up well under
scrutiny and can be considered weak. On balance, this is a case where
parallelism and horizontal equity should prevail.'45
E.

LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS

When an individual dies, no deduction is allowed for the loss of that
individual's human capital. Yet, the receipt of the proceeds of a life
insurance policy typically is excluded from the recipient's income under
Code section ioi(a)(i). There are several exceptions to that exclusion.
Interest received on the insurer's retention of the proceeds is taxable
when distributed."6 The interest element in amounts that are paid to
beneficiaries in installments is taxable.'47 If the insurance contract had
been transferred for consideration prior to the insured's death, the
"transfer for value" rule could cause the recognition of income in the
amount by which the proceeds exceed the consideration and premiums
previously paid by the distributee; but there
18 are circumstances in which
the transfer for value rule does not apply. ,
The exclusion of the life insurance proceeds, while denying a
deduction for the loss of human capital on the death of an uninsured
individual, contravenes the principle of parallelism. The context of this
situation may seem familiar to the reader since the circumstance is
similar to the issue discussed in Part III.B of this Article dealing with
damages received for a physical injury. The circumstances have much in
common, especially when the physical injury results in death. In both
cases, the payments (damage payments or life insurance proceeds) are
not necessarily made to the estate of the decedent; they often are payable
to someone who survived the decedent. But they are both paid to replace
the human capital that was lost because of the decedent's death.'49
The reasons for not allowing a deduction for the loss of
unreimbursed human capital that are discussed in Part III.B apply
equally to the instant situation and will not be repeated here. However,
the reasons for excluding damages for physical injuries do not apply to

145. Another objection to the limitation on employee expense deductions is that they do not apply
to independent contractors whose business expenses are nonitemized deductions and fully deductible.
That difference in treatment raises an issue of horizontal equity unless a good reason exists for treating
independent contractors more favorably. In a prior article, I questioned whether the distinction is
warranted. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 62-63.
146. I.R.C. § IOI(C) (2000).
147. Id. § IoI(d).
148. Id. § ioi(a)(2). For example, the transfer for value rule does not apply to transfers made to: a
corporation of which the insured is a shareholder or officer, a partnership in which the insured is a
partner, or a partner of the insured. Id. § iox(a)(2)(B).
149. Damages for wrongful death can include payments for more than the loss of human capital.
For example, in some states, damages can be ordered for the pain and suffering that the victim
incurred. Nevertheless, damages for the loss of human capital will be a part of the award.
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the same extent to the receipt of life insurance proceeds.
One might contend that the receipt of life insurance proceeds is not
as easily classified as an involuntary conversion since a voluntary
decision was made to purchase the insurance contract.'5 ° However, the
death of the insured that triggered the payment of the proceeds is almost
always involuntary. By analogy, the receipt of insurance proceeds for the
loss of property incurred from a casualty or theft is treated as an
involuntary conversion. There seems to be no reason to regard the
receipt of life insurance proceeds differently. The policy of treating
involuntary conversions liberally should apply to the receipt of life
insurance proceeds. That consideration alone is not sufficient to justify
an exclusion, but it lends support to that treatment if other
considerations point in the same direction.
The human capital that was lost by the insured's death is not bought
and sold in commercial markets. 5 ' The insurance proceeds are designed
to replace that capital with dollars since monetary replacement is all that
is available. There is a significant noncommercial element to the
insurance even though it involves dollars. If the government were to tax
the proceeds, or so much of the proceeds as exceeded the premiums paid,
it would be preventing the insured from providing adequate substitution
to his beneficiaries of what they lost when he died. While there is some
unpleasant aspect of the government's cashing in on the insured's death
to the detriment of his family in many cases, it lacks the rapacious
appearance that the taxation of damages would engender.'5 2 This
consideration has less force here than when applied to the receipt of
damages for physical injuries.
The case for excluding life insurance proceeds on principled grounds
is not as strong as it is in the case of physical injury damages. It seems
likely that the proceeds are excluded to encourage the purchase of life
insurance on the ground that having families protected from destitution
(or protecting families from having to liquidate family-owned businesses)
because of the loss of an income producer is socially desirable, and so life
insurance should be encouraged by the tax law to implement that policy.
In addition, if the insurance proceeds were taxed, an insured individual
would need to purchase a much higher amount of insurance to cover his
15o. There are some commentators who argued that because life insurance premiums are not
deductible, the proceeds should be excluded. See SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 9, at I06-O7

(discussing, but not advocating, the argument). However, I believe that the nondeductability of
premiums is attributable to the consumption element of obtaining the risk coverage that insurance
provides, and has little, if any, effect on the excludability of the proceeds.
151. Obviously, people do exploit their human capital commercially. For example, an employed
person receives wages in return for the use of his human capital. But, that is a type of leasing
arrangement as contrasted to a disposition of the capital.
152. The lack of concern for this appearance is reflected in the application of an estate tax on the
death of an individual, although that tax applies only to wealthy individuals.
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needs. While Congress may wish to encourage the purchase of life
insurance coverage, it has no reason to wish to increase the cost of that
coverage.
The adoption of that policy of encouraging the acquisition of life
insurance is buttressed by the considerations noted above,
acknowledging that some are weaker here than in the case of physical
damages. However persuasive one does or does not find that
justification, it has no application to the question of allowing a deduction
for the death of an uninsured person. The lack of parallelism appears
justified if one accepts the apparent rationale for excluding the life
insurance proceeds, but is not justified if one concludes that the grounds
for excluding the proceeds are inadequate. In the latter case, it is not a
question of applying parallelism, but merely that there are not strong
enough grounds for providing an exclusion.
F.

MEALS AND LODGING

Meals and lodging that are furnished to an employee, his spouse, and
dependents on the employer's business premises for the convenience of
the employer are excluded from the employee's income by Code section
119(a) if certain conditions are satisfied.'53 The "business premises"
requirement has been expanded to a small extent by the judicial and
administrative construction of that term, but the expansion is very
narrow and limited.'54 Also, in certain circumstances, an employer's
furnishing of meals to employees can be excluded as a de minimis fringe
benefit under Code section 132(e)(2). Yet, if not provided by the
employer or incurred in connection with a move from one business
location to another, or business or entertainment, or travel away from
home, the employee's cost of such meals and lodging is not deductible.'55
The question is whether that nonparallel treatment is justified.
It is easy to understand why an individual's cost of meals and lodging
for himself and his immediate family generally are not deductible,
because they constitute personal consumption. The Code expressly
provides, subject to specific exceptions, "no deduction shall be allowed
for personal, living, or family expenses.' ',

6

Even if that provision were

153. In the case of lodging, there is an additional requirement that the employee have been
required by his employer to accept the lodging as a condition of his employment. For a discussion of
the application of this exclusion, see KAHN & KAHN, supra note 34, at 164-68.
154. "Business premises" must be either premises "where the employee performs a significant
portion of his duties or... where the employer conducts a significant portion of his business."
Lindeman v. Comm'r, 6o T.C. 609, 615 (1973) (citing Comm'r v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th Cir.
1966)), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 2;see KAHN & KAHN, supra note 34, at 165-66 (discussing when the lodging

can be physically separated from the employer's regular place of business because business is also
conducted at the lodging).
155. Treas. Reg. § I.262-i(b)(5) (as amended in 1972).
156. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2000).
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omitted from the Code, such expenses would not be deductible because
they would not fit within any Code provision granting a deduction. The
denial of a deduction for such expenses comports with a fundamental
principle of taxation that no deduction is allowable for personal
consumption.
While the reasons for excluding from an employee's income the
meals and lodging provided by the employer for the employer's
convenience are not set forth in any authoritative statement, the likely
purposes of the exclusion are reasonably discernible. The exclusion
initially was established by two administrative rulings in 1919 . 157 One of
those rulings exempted from gross income the value of meals and lodging
furnished to a seaman while aboard ship. 58 As to the exclusion of the
lodging, it is easy to see why the government agreed to exclude it from
income. A seaman has to live somewhere when he is not at sea, and often
that meant that the cost of lodging at sea duplicated an expense that the
seaman also incurred to maintain a home on land. The duplicated or
added expense of a berth at sea was attributable to the requirements of
the seaman's work. In the case of many seamen, the employer's provision
of lodging did not add to the seaman's wealth, since it did not relieve him
of the expense of maintaining a home. Moreover, the berth provided by
the employer typically would be spartan; and since comparable quarters
were not sold on the market, it would be difficult to value.'5 9
The circumstance in which the lodging exclusion was applied to a
seaman is one in which an expense paid by the employee for that lodging
would be deductible today. If the seaman had to pay for his lodging, the
expense would qualify today under Code section 162(a)(2) as a
deductible business travel expense away from home. But, even in that
case, the exclusion is a nonparallel provision because the seaman's
deduction would be an employee business expense and so would be
subject to the severe limitations imposed on miscellaneous itemized
deductions.' 6 Moreover, unlike the case of the seaman, many of the
circumstances to which the exclusion has been applied are ones in which
no deduction would have been allowable to the employee if he had borne
the cost of the meals and lodging.
157. O.D. II,i C.B. 66(1919); O.D. 265,I C.. 71 (19I9).
158. O.D. 265, 1 C.. 71 (1919).
159. Another early illustration of the rule was its application to the Army's provision of lodging
quarters (or the commuted value of the lodging) to officers. Jones v. United States, 6o Ct. Cl. 552, 56263 (1925).
16o. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In a prior article, I concluded that the limitations
on the deduction of employee business expenses are unwarranted. Kahn, supra note 2. If the seaman
were required by the employer to pay a specified amount for his lodging then the proper treatment is
to reduce the seaman's salary by the amount he is required to pay back to the employer and to treat
the seaman as having been furnished the lodging. See Treas. Reg. § i.ii9-i(b) (as amended in 1985);
infra note 178.
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Even from the time of its initiation in i919, the exclusion was not
limited to circumstances where the lodging constituted a double expense.
In the other 1919 ruling, 6 , cash paid to an employee of the American
Red Cross for maintenance expenses was held to be excluded from
income to the extent that the employee's actual maintenance expenses
did not exceed the amount he received. However, cash payments of that
nature would not qualify for Code section i19 today and would be
included in the employee's income. ' There still is no requirement of a
double expense in current law, and so one has to search elsewhere for a
rationale for the exclusion.
As to the seaman's meals that his employer provided, there was no
double expense, and so once again we see that the double expense
justification does not explain the adoption of what constitutes a much
broader rule. We must look further for an explanation.
One year after the promulgation of the two I919 rulings, Treasury
amended its regulations to provide that lodging furnished to an employee
for the convenience of the employer are excluded from income.' 63 From
that time on, the exclusion was established, but it underwent many
alterations over the years.'6 4 On account of the confusion as to the
application of the exclusion and of congressional dissatisfaction with the
restrictive construction that the government adopted, Congress enacted
'
Code section 119 as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 65

Unfortunately, the statutory codification of the exclusion did not dispel
all of the confusion over its application, and questions continued to be
litigated and alterations made.'
What then is the rationale for the exclusion? Professor Kragen and
Ms. Speer stated:
The premise underlying exclusion in section i I9 is that the greater the

employer's control of the employee's enjoyment of the meals or
lodging, the less likely they will be considered as compensation and the
less directly will the employee be held to have been benefited. If the
employee is benefited only indirectly, the value of the accommodations
provided will be excluded from income, even though some

161. O.D. 1I, i C.B. 66 (i919).

162. See Comm'r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83 (1977). While it is clear that Congress intended to
tax cash receipts for meals and lodging, that distinction has been criticized as irrational. See generally
Adrian A. Kragen & Klonda Speer, I.R.C. Section ig:
Concept?, 29 HASnNGs L.J. 921 (1978).
63. T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920).

Is Convenience of the Employer a Valid

64. For a history of the tax law's treatment of the exclusion, see Kragen & Speer, supra note 162,
at 922-27.
165. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4042; Kragen & Speer, supra
note 162, at 927.
66. Kragen & Speer, supra note 162, at 928; see also J. Patrick McDavitt, Note, Dissection of a
Malignancy: The Convenience of the Employer Doctrine,44 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1104, 1138 (I969).
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67
compensation factor is present.'

While there is no authoritative support for the proposition, there is
reason to believe that the tax law generally will not tax benefits received
by someone who obtains those benefits by being the incidental
beneficiary of actions taken by another for the other's own purposes
other than a compensatory purpose. For example, if an applicant for
employment is invited by a -prospective employer to travel to the
employer's location for an interview, and if the prospective employer
reimburses the applicant for his travel expenses, the reimbursement will
be excluded from the applicant's income.' 68 It is in the prospective
employer's economic interest to have the applicant come to it rather than
to send its agents to the applicant. The applicant benefits from being
provided travel to the interview, but the prospective employer did not
provide that travel in order to compensate the applicant. The applicant
can be viewed as an 69incidental beneficiary of a business act of the
prospective employer.'
When meals and lodging are provided by an employer for its own
business purposes, an employee's benefit can be seen as
noncompensatory and incidental to the employer's action. While, in
many cases, the parties are aware that the employee does benefit
financially from the arrangement, and so it can affect the compensation
paid to the employee, and thereby has a compensatory element,
compensation for services is not the primary motivating force. 70
Another reason for the exclusion is the administrative difficulty of
arriving at a fair valuation of the benefits the employee received. When
property is received or given in kind, the income tax law typically values
it at the price that would be paid by a willing buyer from a willing seller
where both parties have full knowledge of relevant information and
neither is under a compulsion to buy or sell.' 7' Of course, property is
bought and sold in different markets (e.g., retail, wholesale, private sale),
and the geographic location of the market can alter the price. But, that
factor has not proved to cause difficulty in the tax law's determination of
value. In some cases, the benefits received by the employee are not ones
that are sold on the market, and so valuation becomes more speculative
in that case. But, that is not always true, and sometimes (for example, in
the case of meals for restaurant employees) the same items are sold to
167. See Kragen & Speer, supra note 162, at 929.
I68. Rev. Rul. 63-77, 1963-I C.B. 177; see infra Part III.G.
169. See discussion infra Part III.G.
170. See Treas. Reg. 1.T 19-i(a)(2) (as amended in 1985) ("[I]f the employer furnishes meals to his
employee for a substantial noncoropensatory business reason, the meals so furnished will be regarded
as furnished for the convenience of the employer, even though such meals are also furnished for a
compensatory reason.").
171. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § I.I7oA-I(C)(2) (as amended in 1996).
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the public.'72
But, the problem of determining the value of the employee's
benefits is more difficult than merely determining the market value of
the items. One aspect of meals and lodging that qualify for the exclusion
is that the employee has little or no choice as to whether to accept them.
In the case of lodging, acceptance must be a condition of the employee's
employment.'73 So, while the market puts one value on the benefit
received, it may have a much lower subjective value to the employee.
While the tax law does not ordinarily accommodate subjective
differences,' 7 it seems unrealistic to ignore them in this situation.
Consider the plight of a janitor who is employed by a luxury hotel in an
isolated area and is provided a room in the basement of the hotel for his
living quarters, a room that would not otherwise be rented to clients of
the hotel. If the location and elegance of the hotel is taken into account,
the room will have a much greater value than the janitor could afford or
would ever pay. But the room does have a subjective value to the janitor
that is significantly less than its market value. The difficulty of
establishing that subjective value is a factor in allowing the exclusion and
thereby avoiding that problem.
Are those reasons adequate to justify the exclusion? In the case of a
double expenditure for lodging, it would seem so; but that is not the
typical application of the rule. The rule of exclusion provides a great
advantage to taxpayers who are employed in jobs that require them to
live on the business premises, and that difference in treatment of
employees violates the principle of horizontal equity.'75 Of course, the
same can be said of all fringe benefits that are excluded from income.
But the value of meals and lodging can be quite substantial, and so
considerations of equity take on greater weight. Professor Kragen and
Ms. Speer concluded that the exclusion is not justified and should be
repealed, although they did not believe that there is political support for
repeal. I, 6 In my view, the exclusion should be retained for the reasons
stated above, but should be modified to be more restricted in some areas
and more expansive in others.'77
172. See Kragen & Speer, supra note 162, at 949.
173. I.R.C. § i1 9(a)(2) (2000). While Code section 19 does not require that the employee accept
provided meals, practical considerations often will mean that he has no realistic opportunity to eat
elsewhere. Time constraints often make the proffered meal the only one that is feasible.
174. Cf. Pevsner v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 467,47o-71 (5th Cir. 198o).
175. The employee's advantage is mitigated to the extent that the benefit he receives is reflected in
a reduction of the employee's salary.
176. Kragen & Speer, supra note 162, at 949-51.
177. Professors Kragen and Speer recommended modification because they did not believe that
repeal was politically feasible. Id. While the scope of the exclusion should be narrowed in some
respects, it should be broadened in others. For example, the denial of an exclusion for cash
reimbursements is not warranted. Id.
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In any event, if the reasons for having the exclusion, perhaps with
modifications, are deemed adequate, as I believe them to be, there
should be no concern that a deduction is not allowed for the cost of such
items when they are not provided by the employer. There are good
reasons not to allow a deduction, and the valuation and incidental benefit
rationales for the exclusion do not apply to the situation where the
employee pays for his lodging and meals. ,8 While the exclusion does
violate horizontal equity by discriminating against employees whose jobs
do not require them to live on the business premises, those persons have
a greater choice as to where to live or eat, and so they are not in the
identical position of the tax favored employee. Moreover, some of an
employee's advantage from the exclusion will be lost to the extent it
causes a reduction of the employee's salary; but, that reduction of the
employee's benefit may be offset by the benefit the employer enjoys
from paying lower wages, which violates the horizontal equity principle
as to the employers. It is a value judgment as to whether the disparate
treatment is so offensive
as to warrant repealing the exclusion, but I do
79
not deem it to be So,
G.

JOB INTERVIEW EXPENSES

Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(f) states that "expenses such as
those paid or incurred in seeking employment or in placing oneself in a
position to begin rendering personal services for compensation" are not
deductible under Code section 212. The construction of that provision
has had a checkered history, ' but it finally has been construed to mean
that expenses of seeking employment in a trade or business in which the
taxpayer is not already actively engaged are not deductible; but expenses
of seeking employment in the same trade or business in which the
taxpayer is already engaged (or was previously engaged if the
unemployment gap is not too great) are deductible as a business expense
under Code section I62. ' I However, even when deductible, since it will
be an employee business expense, an expense will be a miscellaneous
itemized deduction that is subject to severe limitations on the amount
178. There is an exception, and properly so, if the employee is charged a fixed amount for the
meals and lodging, and is required to pay it regardless of whether he accepts the benefit. Treas. Reg.
§ i. i9-i(a)(3), (b) (as amended in 1985). In that case, the situation is substantively identical to the
situation where the employee is provided the meals or lodging and is paid a lower salary. The
additional salary which must be returned to the employer is merely a bookkeeping item and should be
disregarded since it does not alter the substance of the arrangement. See supra note 16o.
179. Food and lodging are only one example of nonparallel treatment provided by the Code in the
employee benefit area. The two largest examples, in terms of dollar amounts, are employer-provided
health insurance and retirement benefits. In order to determine whether such nonparallel treatment is
justified, each item must be examined separately to see if there are countervailing considerations that
outweigh the goal of parallelism.
18o. See KAHN & KAHN, supra note 34, at 446-48; Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55.
181. Rev. Rul. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 55.
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that can be deducted.l
The reason for denying a deduction for expenses of seeking
employment in a new trade or business is that the taxpayer is not yet
engaged in that trade, and so the expenditures cannot qualify as business
expenses. As to whether they could be treated as incurred "for the
production of income" within the meaning of Code section 212(1), they
will not qualify for deduction under that provision because they are
capital expenditures (i.e., expenditures incurred in an attempt to create a
relationship that will produce future income). Capital expenditures are
not currently deductible.' 83 Even if such expenses were held to be
deductible, the deduction would be a miscellaneous itemized deduction,
which is subject to severe limitations as to the amount that can be
deducted. 184
In contrast to the treatment of unreimbursed expenses incurred in
seeking employment, consider the tax treatment of a taxpayer who is
reimbursed by a prospective employer for the cost of traveling to the
employer's location, including living costs incurred while at the location.
In Revenue Ruling 63-77,85 the Service held that the taxpayer can
exclude such reimbursements from his income. This exclusion is not
parallel to the treatment of unreimbursed expenses since the latter are
either not deductible at all or are deductible as miscellaneous itemized
deductions subject to severe limitations.
The justification for excluding the reimbursements was briefly noted
above in connection with the tax treatment of an employer's provision of
meals and lodging to an employee.'" It is in the business interests of the
prospective employer to have the employee travel to the prospective
employer's location so that the employer can interview him. The
applicant is performing an act for the benefit of the prospective
employer, and so the costs incurred in that act should be borne by the
prospective employer on whose behalf they are incurred. In this light,
note that the Service has ruled that "[i]t is... a well established position
of the Internal Revenue Service that reimbursements for expenses
incurred by a taxpayer on behalf of another in a nonemployment context
are not includible in the taxpayer's gross income."'"" Of course, the
applicant also benefits from making the trip to the employer's location in
that he obtains an opportunity to receive a job offer, and he may enjoy
the trip, especially if the prospective employer is located in an interesting
or attractive city. But, the purpose of the prospective employer in
182. See supra Part nI.D.
183. I.R.C. § 263 (2000).
184. See supra Part III.D.
185. 1963-I C.B. 177.
186. See supra Part III.F.
187. Rev. Rul. 80-99, I98O-I C.B. io.
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making the reimbursement is not to compensate the applicant; it is made
to pay the costs of actions for the prospective employer's benefit. The
applicant can be seen as an incidental beneficiary of the prospective
employer's expenditures, and should not be taxed for the benefits he
enjoyed as an incidental consequence of the prospective employer's
business activity.
Another element of job interviewing expenses should be noted. One
problem with allowing full deductions for job interviewing expenditures
is the difficulty in determining whether the applicant's interest in the job
is bona fide. If a full deduction were allowed, a taxpayer might arrange
an interview with a firm in a resort town in order to qualify his travel for
a deduction. While that may also occur when the prospective employer
reimburses the applicant for his expenses, the difference in that latter
case is that an independent party made a judgment that the applicant has
a serious interest in the job, and the strength of that judgment is
evidenced by the fact that the prospective employer expended its own
funds to bring the applicant to the interview. There is merit to the
government's accepting the bona fides of a taxpayer's action where a
third party has demonstrated its belief that the action is business
related.'88

The lack of parallel treatment here is not sufficient to warrant
making any changes. There are good reasons not to allow a deduction for
unreimbursed expenses incurred in seeking a job in a new trade or
business. The question of whether deductible expenses in interviewing
for a job in the same trade or business should be subjected to severe
restrictions raises issues as to whether those limitations are defensible at
all, and, if so, whether they are defensible in the context of employee
business expenses. The resolution of those issues is broader than the
question of parallelism and has little to do with the subject of this
Article. '89 There are good reasons for excluding reimbursements from
income that have no application to unreimbursed expenses. Parallelism is
not a meaningful issue in this context of job interviewing expenses.
CONCLUSION

A proposal for the repeal or alteration of a specific tax provision
often will utilize the principle of parallelism or horizontal equity
(parallelism is merely one aspect of the broader concept of horizontal
equity) to support that proposal. While these two principles are not
irrelevant, they should have little weight and often are utilized
inappropriately. The application of these principles rests initially on a

j88. The same substantiation argument could apply in other situations where an exclusion is
allowed.
189. See generally Kahn, supranote 2.
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determination that persons who are given different tax treatments
occupy essentially the same income positions. The identification of the
points of contact between two taxpayers that are sufficient to make their
income positions equal invokes value judgments over which reasonable
people can, and often do, disagree. But, the source of the frailty of the
utility of those two principles lies deeper than the mere difficulty of
identifying those items that constitute their relevant points of
comparison.
Horizontal equity applies to two persons who are in very similar
income positions. Nonparallelism refers to providing different tax
treatment to circumstances that are essentially the same. Two persons
are rarely in identical circumstances, and two circumstances that appear
to be the same have significant differences. To resolve whether two
persons or circumstances are to be treated the same by the tax law, it is
necessary to determine whether the differences that exist are relevant for
that purpose. The problem is that even factual circumstances that are
similar can raise quite different tax policy considerations that lead to
treating them differently for tax purposes.
For example, in the case of two persons who incurred a similar loss
for which one was reimbursed and one was not, an obvious difference
between them is that one was reimbursed. If the tax excludes the
reimbursement from income but denies a deduction for the loss, does
that violate horizontal equity? Given that the exclusion of the
reimbursement from income has the identical tax consequence to
allowing a deduction for the loss, it is easy to leap to the conclusion that
the tax treatment is equivalent to allowing a deduction for reimbursed
taxpayers while denying one to unreimbursed taxpayers. However, as
shown in the text, the apparent equivalence of an exclusion to a
deduction is an illusion. The tax policy considerations that arise in
connection with the tax treatment of a reimbursement can be quite
different from the policies that arise from the tax treatment of an
unreimbursed loss. Those differences in tax policy considerations turn
the apparent identity of the two situations into a mirage that vanishes
under inspection. Even if the similarity of the circumstances of the two
taxpayers is deemed sufficient to invoke the principle of horizontal
equity, that principle may be outweighed by other considerations that
point in the opposite direction. Putting it differently, horizontal equity is
merely one consideration or goal to be weighed together with other
relevant considerations.
Each instance of different tax treatments must be examined
separately to determine whether the difference is warranted. As to the
tax provisions discussed in this Article, the reader can see that different
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tax treatment is warranted for most of those provisions, but is not proper
for some.'"
Although the principles of parallelism and horizontal equity often
are proffered as justifications for a proposed change in the tax law, the
proponents typically attribute far more weight to those principles then
they deserve. Moreover, in the case of some provisions, the principles are
inapplicable because the apparent equivalence of circumstances proves
to be an illusion. It is for this reason that the title to this Article refers to
the "mirage of equivalence."

19o. This Article has covered only a few instances of nonparallel treatment in the Code, but there
are many others (especially in the employee fringe benefit area).

